One-party Dominance of BJP: Emerging Dynamics of Conflict and Co-operation in Indian Federalism
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00195561231177024 |
| Author | Mool Raj Sharma |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
One-party Dominance
of BJP: Emerging
Dynamics of Conflict
and Co-operation in
Indian Federalism
Mool Raj Sharma1
Abstract
Federalism in India is a unique framework of governance that aims to meet the
necessities of a heterogeneous and variegated society. In the Indian design, the
destiny of States rests with the Union government, which can alter, dissolve or
redefine issues with consultation, but without their consent. The rationale for
adopting such an arrangement was to discourage centrifugal forces that had led
to communal carnage and the partition of the Indian sub-continent at the time
of Independence in 1947. Post-Independence, multiple constitutional, political and
societal factors shaped the nature and course of Indian federalism as it evolved
from one-party dominance of the Congress party to a phase of multiparty coali-
tions led by a national and/or regional parties in the 1990s and thereafter under a
bi-nodal coalitional system. Subsequently, since 2014 the advent of BJP as a domi-
nant party has strengthened federal centralisation that has unleashed several
challenges that have a number of ramifications for federalism. Therefore, this paper
examines the working of Indian federalism with a focus on contemporary trends of
centralisation, conflict and co-operation.
Keywords
Bi-nodal, Centralisation, Centrifugal, Political Change
Introduction
Federalism is a complex concept that has its genesis and growth in the specic
socio-economic and political necessities of different societies. Most heterogene-
ous and territorially large, multinational societies adopted it as a solution for their
Article
Indian Journal of Public
Administration
69(3) 513–528, 2023
© 2023 IIPA
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/00195561231177024
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1 Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, Jammu, India.
Corresponding author:
Mool Raj Sharma, Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, Jammu 180006, India.
E-mail: moolrajsharma9@gmail.com
514 Indian Journal of Public Administration 69(3)
increasing societal problems and to minimise burden on Central institutions. For
Anderson, federalism is a suitable institutional power-sharing arrangement for
countries rooted in complex socio-political, geographical and economic settings
to accommodate diversities and not viable for states with small territorial jurisdic-
tions and homogeneity (Anderson, 2008, p. 12). India’s virtually undeclared fed-
eralism is the largest experiment with diversities, which gives constitutional
privileges to several states for abridging cross-cutting cleavages. A more or less
unique model with a strong Centre in India was driven by compulsions to curb the
centrifugal forces that relentlessly asserted their demands before and continued
even after Independence. A comprehensive scheme of legislative, administrative
and nancial powers in the Constitution gave preeminent position to the Centre to
meet any exigencies that threatened the stability and unity of the Indian nation.
Thus, the semantics of a quintessential federal state was not adopted by the makers
of the Indian Constitution, who instead opted for a ‘holding-together’ model of
federation, by and large. Evidently, their intent and purpose of pragmatism became
obvious when Rajendra Prasad, in the Constituent Assembly, remarked that it did
not make much sense to discuss whether the Constitution is unitary or federal or
any other, but it makes sense that it serves our purpose (Austin, 1966, p. 186).
Since the integration of the modern Indian nation was a challenging task,
asymmetries in the Indian federal design were also incorporated for recognising
regional, ethno-cultural and political aspirations and for upholding the multicul-
tural ethos of the country through differential rights under the Constitution, espe-
cially in the Sixth Schedule. Besides Jammu and Kashmir, which was granted
special status under Article 370 of Indian Constitution, exceptions were also
recognised for tribal areas in any state under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules and
under Article 371, which have signicant relevance in the multi-ethnic and het-
erogeneous Indian state. Different clauses over time were incorporated in Article
371, as per changing nature of the states: 371(B), 371(C), 371(D), 371(E), 371(F),
371(H), 371(I) and 371(J) for Maharashtra, Gujarat, Assam, Manipur, Andhra
Pradesh, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa and Karnataka (Bhatia, 1997, p. 40).
Structural power-sharing arrangements of this nature are not usually found
elsewhere. Apart from asymmetry among states, there are asymmetric federal
arrangements within some states, if sizeable population and in some cases are
peripheral, topographically segmented and are seen as marginalised from the
mainstream politics. For that purpose, several ‘autonomous councils’ were created
within states for the development of deprived regions, for instance, Darjeeling
Gorkha Hill Council (1988), Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (1994),
Bodoland Autonomous Council (1993) and Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development
Council (Leh 1995 and Kargil 2003). With these autonomous councils, multi-
level federalism has received an impetus in India (Saxena, 2006, p. 113).
Multi-layered federal system has four-fold signicance: rst, it helps people
residing in some regions to preserve their distinct identity and culture. Second, it
enhances political representation in autonomous bodies. Third, it strengthens
democratic temper by providing special governing bodies to peripheral regions
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