Independent Regulatory Authorities as Mechanisms of Political Monitoring
| Published date | 01 September 2018 |
| Author | Reem Abdalla,Thomas D. Lancaster |
| Date | 01 September 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0019556118788483 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Indian Journal of Public
Administration
64(3) 331–348
© 2018 IIPA
SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/0019556118788483
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/ipa
Independent Regulatory
Authorities as Mechanisms
of Political Monitoring
Thomas D. Lancaster1
Reem Abdalla2
Abstract
This article argues that the study of political monitoring can be used to help
situate the study of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). Building upon
previous work on the management of common pool resources and other
literature on monitoring as a component of governance in larger systems,
it looks broadly at liberal democracies’ use of IRAs as monitoring mechanisms.
Identifying fundamental concepts and theoretical components in the study of
political monitoring, this article argues that they can be used as a lens through
which policy analysts can observe and compare IRAs, and thus move beyond
descriptive analysis. While focusing on monitoring, as one of the functions of
IRAs, it highlights theoretical concerns about how to best institutionalise policy-
implementation mechanisms, especially in the area of market interventions and
the governance of public goods.
Keywords
Political monitoring, independent regulatory authorities, institutionalisation,
regulations
Introduction
Monitoring is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of enduring systems
of governance (Ostrom, 2010, p. 71). As one in a sequence of design principles
for good governance (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 94–100), monitoring ‘…appear(s)
to account for the robustness of some systems and the failure of others…’
(Ostrom, 2006, p. 5). More than just about surveillance and oversight, monitoring
1 Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
2 Emory College of Arts and Sciences, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Corresponding author:
Thomas D. Lancaster, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
E-mail: polstdl@emory.edu
332 Indian Journal of Public Administration 64(3)
as conceptualised here advances a simple but deeply probing question: ‘Do actors
change their behaviour if they are being watched, or believe they are being
watched?’ (Lancaster, 2014). The politics of monitoring involves questions about
who does the watching, who is being watched and the goal preferences for
change in the latter’s behaviour. As a relational concept, monitoring’s politics thus
encompasses choices about the structuring of the watching and the mechanisms
utilised. Fundamentally important to help overcome collective action dilemmas,
monitoring and its institutionalisation should be considered within broader
lines of inquiry regarding the structuring of public and market incentives to
govern common pool resources (CPRs), public goods and related macroeconomic
activities.
This article advances the notion that independent regulatory authorities (IRAs)
provide an insightful example of the institutionalisation of monitoring. The IRAs
address many of the same relational interactions, structural choices and behavioural
concerns as Ostrom’s (1990) study of good governance in CPRs.1 Building on
her argument that monitoring is a necessary design principle, this article follows
Lancaster’s (2014, 2015) logic that the study of monitoring is transferable to the
study of governance in larger systems.2 Leaving to others to address the history
of IRA diffusion, this article argues that IRAs are unique institutionalisations
of political monitoring in specific policy arenas, that they serve as monitoring
mechanisms in addressing policy-related questions of governance and that the
study of political monitoring as a necessary component in overcoming collective
action problems can theoretically help frame the comparative study of IRAs.
Looking at IRAs as mechanisms of political monitoring, this article initially
identifies political monitoring as an important analytical concept in theorising
about collective action problems. It then briefly describes IRAs and functionally
situates them as mechanisms created to monitor and to regulate economic-related
behaviour. Third, this article looks at some of the common theoretical goals
shared by the study of political monitoring and of IRAs and, then, highlights some
analytical similarities. Next, the article raises several areas of concern for future
research on IRAs, including principal-agents relationship problems, independence
and questions of democratic accountability, the importance of credible commit-
ment and costs associated with IRAs as monitoring mechanisms. Before conclud-
ing, encouragement is given to consider issues of IRAs’ operations as monitoring
mechanisms within contexts of multi-level and embedded governance.
Political Monitoring’s Theoretical Framework
Monitoring involves a player watching the behaviour of another in a game—or a
person or organisation watching another in a collective system (Gardner &
Ostrom, 1991, p. 130). The rationale for monitoring is to hold the other directly
accountable for adherence to the game’s or system’s set of ‘appropriate rules’
(Agrawal & Ostrom, 2006, p. 682). Concerned with sustainable management of
public goods and evasion of ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenarios, Ostrom (1990)
sees monitoring as necessary to overcome collective action problems and lists
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