Governor in Indian Federalism—II: Hiatus between Constitutional Intents and Practices
| Date | 01 March 2017 |
| Author | Ashok Pankaj |
| DOI | 10.1177/0019556117689850 |
| Published date | 01 March 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Indian Journal of Public
Administration
63(1) 13–40
© 2017 IIPA
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0019556117689850
http://ipa.sagepub.com
1 Professor, Council for Social Development, New Delhi, India.
Corresponding author:
Ashok Pankaj, Professor, Council for Social Development, 53, Lodi Estate, New Delhi-110003, India.
E-mail: ashokpankaj@gmail.com
Governor in Indian
Federalism—II: Hiatus
between Constitutional
Intents and Practices
Ashok Pankaj1
Abstract
In this second part of the article, the first part deals with the Constituent Assembly
(CA) debates on power, position and role of Governor in the Indian constitu-
tion, the profiles of the incumbents of Raj Bhavans, their average tenures and
their role as envisaged in the constitution have been examined. It explains that
as against the intentions of the constitution-makers, the majority of Governors
(52.3 per cent) appointed between 1950 and April 2015 have been from active
political backgrounds including former chief ministers who constituted 12.9 per
cent. Only 18 per cent of the tenures of Governors have been of full 5-year term
and another 8 per cent of between 4 and 5 years. Except for a few who rose
above partisan considerations, Governors have often obliged on the political
demands of the union government and worst on the ruling party at the centre.
This hiatus between constitutional intents and practices has widened since 1967.
While there have been many course corrections in Indian federalism in recent
years, the role of Governor continues to be largely on uncorrected path, except
one major improvement—a judicial check on the misuse of Article 356 following
the Bommai judgment.
Keywords
Governor, Indian constitution, federalism, constitutional practices
Recapitulating
The Constituent Assembly (CA) of India was set up on the recommendations of
the Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946, that envisaged a confederal constitution for India.
As per the so-called federal plan of the Cabinet Mission, the CA by its resolution
14 Indian Journal of Public Administration 63(1)
of 30 April 1947, constituted a Union Constitution Committee and a Provincial
Constitution Committee to suggest a model constitution, respectively, for the
union1 and the provinces.2 The model principles for the union and the provincial
constitutions, as proposed by the two committees, favoured a parliamentary
type of government both at the centre and in the provinces under a federal
arrangement.
Accordingly, the model provincial constitution proposed an ‘elected Governor’
with security of tenure and discretionary special responsibilities to prevent any
grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of the province or any part thereof.
The elected premiers of the provinces, under the Government of India Act, 1935,
a number of them were also members of the CA, strongly opposed the provision
of elected Governor as another centre of political power and potential source
of tensions between the elected chief minister and elected Governor. They also
argued about the futility of having an elected head of the state in a parliamentary
type of government. The protagonists of strong union were also opposed to the
strong and independent position of Governor with fixed tenure and rigid removal
procedure. They alluded to partition, pre- and post-partition communal violence,
communist movement in Telangana, food shortage and spiralling inflation and
lurking secessionist threats of a few princely states to emphasise the necessity of
a strong union and its effective control over the provinces through a Governor, an
appointee of the union government.
Consequently, in the Draft Constitution, the original position of Governor,
as proposed in the Memorandum of the Constitutional Advisor to the CA and
the Report of the Provincial Constitution Committee, was altered. The ‘elected
Governor’ became ‘appointed’. The Governor lost the security of tenure that
became subject to ‘the pleasure of the President’, although notionally appointed
for 5 year. His ‘special responsibilities’ were, however, retained in the form of
President’s rule in the state. The dilution in the independent position of Governor
was opposed by the federalists who apprehended that the centre would misuse the
weak position of Governor.
Defending changes in the provisions related to the selection and security of
tenure and retention of discretionary power of the Governor in the provinces, it was
argued that healthy conventions would develop with respect to the appointment
of Governor on merit, security of tenure and the exercise of discretionary power
by the Governor in provinces. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, a prominent member
of the CA, envisaged that ‘the convention will grow up of the Government of
India consulting the provincial Cabinet, in the election of the Governor’ and ‘the
President may. . . choose a person of undoubtful ability and position in public life
who at the same time has not been mixed up in provincial party struggle or fac-
tions’ (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1999b, p. 431). He further emphasised that
the ‘the central fact to be remembered is that the Governor is to be a constitutional
head, sagacious counsellor and advisor to the Ministry, one who can throw oil
over troubled waters’ (ibid., p. 431).
The working of the constitution suggests that the apprehensions of some
members of the CA that the union government would misuse weak position of
Governor, often for political considerations, have been proved largely correct.
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