Governor in Indian Federal Constitution—I: Constituent Assembly Debates Revisited

DOI10.1177/0019556120150402
AuthorAshok K. Pankaj
Date01 October 2015
Published date01 October 2015
Subject MatterArticle
GOVERNOR IN INDIAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION-I:
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
DEBATES REVISITED
ASHOK
K.
PANKAJ
This article revisits the Constituent Assembly Debates,
and
argues that the intention
of
the Constitution makers
was
to
make provisions
for
Governor
in
sync with a fuller
federal Constitution, at least the original proposal suggests
so.
The
Report
of
the Provincial Constitution Committee had
provided
for
an elected Governor who will have ·security
of
tenure
and
discretionary special responsibilities
to
prevent
any grave menace
to
the peace and tranquillity
of
the province
or
any part thereof
The provision
of
elected Governor was strongly opposed
by
the then Premiers
of
provinces. Strong
and
independent
position
of
Governor was also contested by the protagonists
of
a strong Centre. Consequently, the provision
of
'elected'
Governor became 'appointed',
and
Governor lost the
security
of
tenure that became subject to the 'pleasure
of
the President'. However, his 'special responsibilities 'were
retained in the shape
of
Presidents rule
in
a State.
Nevertheless, the Assembly intended the Governor as a
constitutional head
of
a State who would be
·a
person
of·
undoubiful ability and position
in
public life who at the same
time has not been mixed up
in
provincial party struggle or
factions'.
INTRODUCTION
THE ORIGINAL proposal
of
the
Constituent Assembly was
to
provide
for
Governors
in
provinces
in
sync
with
a truly
federal
Constitution. But post-
partition/post-independence and amidst secessionist threats
of
a
few
princely
States, the.federal sentiments were subdued
in
favour
of
a
strong
Centre.
1
The
original position
of
the
Governor,
as
proposed
in
the
memorandum
of
612
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JOURNAL
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the Constitutional Advisor to the Constituent Assembly and
the
report
of
the
Provincial Constitution Committee, was altered to suit a strong Centre even
though federalism was retained as basic organising principle
of
the Indian
Constitution.
The Constituent Assembly oflndia was set up on the recommendations
of
the Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946, that envisaged a federal Constitution for India:
There should be a Union
of
India consisting
of
the provinces and the
Indian States and it should have the power to deal with the subjects
of
defence, foreign affairs and communication with the ancillary powers
to raise the finance for the above subjects .... All subjects other than the
Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the provinces
(Singh 2000: 181).
As per the federal scheme
of
the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Constituent
Assembly by its resolution
of
30 April 1947 constituted a Union Constitution
Committee and a Provincial Constitution Committee to suggest model
Constitutions respectively for the Union and the provinces.2 The model
principles for the Union and provincial constitutions, as suggested
by
the
two Committees, favoured a parliamentary type
of
government combined
with a federal arrangement
The
model
of
provincial
Constitution
committee
proposed
provisions for an elected Governor who will have security
of
tenure and
discretionary special responsibilities to prevent any grave menace to the
peace and tranquillity
of
the province
or
any part thereof. The provision
of
'elected Governor' was strongly opposed by the then elected heads
of
provinces who were members
of
the Constituent Assembly. The strong and
independent position
of
Governor and his fixed tenure with rigid removal
procedure was contested by the protagonists
of
a strong Union who alluded to
partition and communal violence, and secessionist threats
of
a few princely
states to suggest the need for a strong Centre. They insisted that there should
be a constitutional mechanism through which the Union government would
watch/control the activities
of
States.
This article visits the Constituent Assembly debates to assert that the
intention
of
the Constitution makers with respect to the role and position
of
Governor in a State was truly federal, even though initial proposals
regarding the election/appointment and removal
of
Governor from the office
were later changed to suit a strong Centre. It also asserts
that
the successive
governments at the Centre have ignored the intention
of
the Constitution
makers and weakened the federal spirit
of
the Constitution
by
treating
Governors as political office
of
the Union government. Governors too have
demeaned the constitutional position by acceding to political demands
of
the
Union governments.

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