The 2013 Karnataka Assembly Outcome: Government Performance and Party Organization Matters
| Author | Sandeep Shastri |
| DOI | 10.1177/2321023013509149 |
| Date | 01 December 2013 |
| Published date | 01 December 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Military-Madrasa-Mullah Complex 135
India Quarterly, 66, 2 (2010): 133–149
A Global Threat 135
Article
The 2013 Karnataka Assembly
Outcome: Government Performance
and Party Organization Matters
Sandeep Shastri1
Abstract
This article assesses the outcome of state assembly elections in Karnataka held in 2013. Extensively
using the Lokniti- Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi Pre-Poll Survey data,
the article concludes that the verdict was more an unequivocal indictment of the state government
rather than a pro-Congress vote. A Congress victory in the state was essentially the channelizing of an
anti-incumbency vote. The article also makes out the case that the vote for a party is often a function
of the voter’s perception of the organizational strength of the party. Mapping electoral developments
in the state, the article concludes that a phase of authentic multi-party competition is clearly ushered in
by the 2013 electoral verdict.
Keywords
Karnataka, JD(S), Congress, BJP, assembly election
In the assembly elections of 2013, the Karnataka electorate indicated a clear preference for change
by voting the Congress party to power with a clear majority. It was after nearly a decade that a single
party was able to form a government without any outside support. Much before the end of the five-
year term of the previous Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, the writing was clear on the wall
that the political mood was against the incumbent. This article argues that the Congress victory fell short
of what was in the ‘range’ of the possible.2 The electoral verdict was a categorical indictment of the
incumbent government which by default benefited the Congress in the main and the Janata Dal(S)3 to
a limited extent. The Congress victory is also linked to its attempts to re-create a social coalition. It is
also evident that the popular perception of the strength of the party organization is an indicator of the
support for it.
The Congress party comfortably passed the majority mark. Given the popular mood, the ‘opportunity’
for the party to secure a more robust victory was distinctly visible (Shastri, 2013). A range of factors
contributed to a more modest victory. The BJP and the JD(S) both won an equal number of seats. The
JD(S) was able to secure the position of the principal opposition on account of a marginally higher vote
share, pushing the BJP to the third position. The Karnataka Janata Party (KJP) led by B.S. Yeddyurappa,
the former Chief Minister who broke away from the BJP, eminently fulfilled his promise of cutting into
the BJP vote share and contributing to the rout of the party.
Sandeep Shastri, Pro Vice Chancellor, Jain University, Bangalore & National Coordinator, Lokniti Network
Studies in Indian Politics
1(2) 135–152
© 2013 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2321023013509149
http://inp.sagepub.com
136 Sandeep Shastri
Studies in Indian Politics, 1, 2 (2013): 135–152
Contextualizing the 2013 Electoral Verdict
Karnataka had made a history of sorts, when the electoral verdict in the 2008 assembly elections led to
the formation of a BJP government. Even though it fell short of the majority mark by three seats, it was
in a position to come to power with the support of independents. This was the first ‘full-fledged’ BJP
government in south India4 (Shastri, 2011). In order to come to power, the BJP was forced to strike a deal
with independent legislators, many of whom were included in the Council of Ministers. Later, the ruling
party launched ‘Operation Lotus’ in order to ‘stabilize’ its government. ‘Operation Lotus’ involved con-
vincing legislators who belonged to the Congress and the JD(S) to resign their seats and contest as BJP
candidates in the resultant bye-election. While many of these new entrants to the BJP won the elections,
it gave birth to a range of challenges. These new entrants had to be rewarded for changing their political
colours, with ministerial berths or chairmanship of corporations. This caused immense heartburn among
the ‘loyalists’ in the party.5 The desire for this ‘manufactured majority’ was defended by Yeddyurappa,
the then Chief Minister and chief architect of the exercise, on the ground that it was the safest bet to
secure the stability of the government (Economic Times, 28 May 2011). An added challenge was the fact
that in the run-up to the 2008 assembly elections and in order to secure a majority, the BJP had inducted
into the party several newcomers. This changed in significant ways the profile of the BJP legislature
party as the ‘loyalists’ who owed allegiance to the frontal organizations linked to the BJP did not form
the core of the party.6 New lobbies (most critically the mining and the real-estate lobby) were emerging
as important forces within the party playing a critical role in funding the election campaign of the party.
Once the party came to power, these groups demanded their share by staking their claim to ministerial
positions and directly influencing the decision-making process.7 Soon after the 2009 Lok Sabha elec-
tions, the different groups within the BJP (especially the mining lobby) became more assertive in their
demands and frequently rebelled against the leadership and even demanded a change of Chief Minister.
They were placated with more sops and concessions.8 Charges of corruption against the Chief Minister
and his kin soon surfaced, further damaging the image of the government. The BJP had come to power
with a promise of being different.9 There was no visible sign of this difference save in terms of a further
downslide on the corruption, nepotism and abdication on the governance front. Simultaneously, fringe
groups emboldened by the formation of a BJP government planned systematic attacks against the minor-
ity communities10 and pushed forward an aggressive Hindu right agenda.11 While the government did
take an official stand against many of these developments, there was very little in terms of decisive
action that was visible.
The infighting in the party was out in the open when the Lok Ayukta report on illegal mining indicted
the incumbent Chief Minister Yeddyurappa and a few of his cabinet colleagues, for violating the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Lok Ayukta, Santosh Hegde, asserted that the investigations ‘showed
a lot of discrepancies’ and led to the ‘incontrovertible conclusion’ that huge losses to the exchequer were
caused (The Hindu, 28 July 2011). The BJP central leadership intervened and opted for a change of lead-
ership. This was strongly opposed by Chief Minister Yeddyurappa. He finally gave in after wresting
several concessions including the right to choose his successor and the promise to be re-installed as
Chief Minister when his name was cleared.12 Sadananda Gowda was handpicked by Yeddyurappa to suc-
ceed him.13 Sadananda Gowda attempted to steer the government away from controversies and restore
the image of the party.14 When he gradually distanced himself from Yeddyurappa his problems began.
The reasons why Gowda decided to move out of his mentor ’s shadow were many. First, being a former
president of the state unit, he had links across the rank and file of the party and had good equations with
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