Taliban 2.0 and US National Security Policy in Afghanistan
| Author | Joshua Snider |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/23477970221129905 |
| Published date | 01 December 2022 |
| Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Research Article
Taliban 2.0 and
US National Security
Policy in Afghanistan
Joshua Snider1,2
Abstract
This article examines from the point of view of the US national security policy,
the causes and contexts for the US exit from Afghanistan and the factors that
will influence the US policy in Afghanistan in the coming decade. It reviews the
logic behind post-9/11 US ‘grand strategy’ and the evolution of the US national
security policy in this period, which included the invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan. It examines the evolution of the US deployment and factors which
complicated the US strategic objectives in Afghanistan, including the persistent
tension in the US national security objectives between counter-terrorism and
nation-building objectives. It argues that the US faces limited palatable options
regarding its post-withdrawal Afghanistan policy and that moving forward, policy
will be constrained by a mix of situational and structural variables. These include
US domestic politics, the Taliban regime itself (and its relationship with ISIS-K) and
the region’s geopolitical winds, notably the strategic positions of Iran, Pakistan,
China and to a lesser extent Russia.
Keywords
Afghanistan, US national security, Afghanistan–US relations, Taliban 2.0, ISIS-K
Introduction
The sudden collapse of the Western-backed government in Afghanistan on
15 August 2021 and the ensuing rapid departure of remaining US troops brought
to an end the longest military deployment in the US history (7 October 2001–15
August 2021). Efforts to achieve a decisive victory against the Taliban by three
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
9(3) 402–423, 2022
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/23477970221129905
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1 National Defense College, Abu Dhabi, UAE
2 The opinions expressed in this work are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the
National Defense College or the United Arab Emirates government
Corresponding author:
Joshua Snider, National Defense College, CFC4+C2W, Al Rawdah, W68 Abu Dhabi, UAE.
E-mail: Joshua.Snider@ndc.ac.ae
Snider 403
successive US Administrations, including President Obama’s 2009 troop surge
which saw an additional 30,000 forces deployed into Afghanistan, were all
ultimately unable to prevent the eventual collapse of the state. By any objective
standard, the US state-building and counter-insurgency efforts could not stave
off the return of the Taliban regime and its brand of Pashto religio-tribal rule.
For its part, the Taliban has proven remarkably agile. Despite being a decidedly
foreign movement, it has successfully linked its ideology to Pashto tribal
nationalism and garnered consistent local support. The moniker ‘Taliban 2.0’
is used to denote the current government, which is essentially the movement’s
second iteration and second time in government. The first was in place between
1996 and 2002. Taliban 2.0 includes the insurgency movement that challenged
the Afghan, the US and NATO coalition between 2002 and 2020 and culminated
in the capture of the Afghan State in August 2021. This iteration of the Taliban
represents a mix of factions and presents a myriad of challenges for the US and
Afghanistan’s neighbours.
This article examines from the point of view of the US national security policy,
the causes and contexts for the US exit from Afghanistan and the factors that will
influence the US policy in Afghanistan in the coming decade. It argues that the US
faces limited palatable options regarding its post-withdrawal Afghanistan policy,
and that moving forward this policy will be constrained by a mix of situational
and structural variables. These include the US domestic politics, the Taliban
regime itself (and its relationship with ISIS-K) and the region’s geopolitical
winds, notably the strategic positions of Iran, India, Pakistan and to a lesser degree
China and Russia.
Amid the myriad of contexts through which the US effort in Afghanistan
can be assessed, the lessons learned by the US national security community
are particularly stark. From a US perspective, the overarching relevance of
Afghanistan to its immediate national security interests and thus the overall
logic of the intervention has and will continue to be debated for decades to come.
At a strategic level, the policy failure in Afghanistan exemplifies a non-partisan
crisis in the US strategic culture resulting from a failure to deliver a compelling
and consistent ‘grand strategy’ to domestic and foreign audiences (Biscop, 2021).
The complexities of the US counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts in
Afghanistan amplify long-standing debates over how and under what circumstances
the US should use its massive military capabilities. While there is broad agreement
that force should be used to deal with existential threats, this term is decidedly
ambiguous. The US public appears increasingly unwilling to support long-term
counterinsurgency as nation-building missions have become ever more common
in the post-9/11 era (Phillips, 2021; Telhami & Kopchick, 2021). At tactical and
operational levels, the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the limits of the
US hegemonic bargaining power, particularly Washington’s limited capacity to
influence intra-state disputes and effect change over non-state actors. Despite the
politicking around redefinitions of success and failure, the mission in Afghanistan
was expensive, costing over US$2.313 trillion and thousands of dead American
service personnel and contractors, and hundreds of thousands of dead Afghans
(Amiri, 2021; Costs of War Project, 2022) (see Figure 1).
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