State Securitization and Internal Ethnic Conflicts in India: Re-visiting the Naga Imbroglio

Date01 December 2015
Published date01 December 2015
DOI10.1177/2347797015601916
Subject MatterArticles
State Securitization and
Internal Ethnic Conflicts
in India: Re-visiting the
Naga Imbroglio
Sreya Maitra Roychoudhury1
Abstract
International relations has systematically theorized the causes and dynamics of
violent internal conflicts since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. India
has internally grappled with internal ethnic turmoil since the immediate post-
independence era. It has historically both used, and justified the use of, armed
forces to tackle insurgencies as existential threats to national security. As India
marches ahead to emerge as a major global power, these conflict zones jettison
India’s domestic stability and democratic credentials, and also render tense rela-
tions with immediate neighbours in South Asia. Insurgent activity of the Nagas
in India’s northeast, which has continued for over 60 years now, is also India’s
first experiment in armed intervention and counter-insurgency. Establishing a
causal link between securitization theory postulated by the Copenhagen School
of Security Studies and internal ethnic conflicts, the paper examines the state
securitization of the Naga crisis, delineating its causes and conditions. The Naga
discourse of resisting assimilation into the Indian state based on ethnic origins and
geographical isolation, and its gradual fragmentation into moderates and radicals
are highlighted. The paper also audits the state securitization of the Naga crisis
by examining the political realities of the 1990s, dynamics and consequences of
the indefinite ceasefire, and critical reflections of the civil society members who
demand inclusion in the ongoing peace process as stakeholders.
Keywords
Securitization, ethnic conflict, insurgency, India, Nagas
Article
1
Senior Research Fellow and Doctoral Candidate, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur
University.
Corresponding author:
Sreya Maitra Roychoudhury, Flat No. 3, Sibayan, 60/260 H.P Dutta Lane, Golf Garden, Kolkata 700032,
India.
E-mail: shreya.maitra@gmail.com
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
2(3) 291–313
2015 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797015601916
http://aia.sagepub.com
292 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 2(3)
Introduction
Violent conflicts between the state and its organized communities of people have
been a subject of much concern, and international relations has systematically
endeavoured to theorize their tendencies, causes, dynamics and possible redressal
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Ethnic identity and allegiances
have emerged as a prominent function of such conflicts, attracting extensive
research. India has grappled with the burning threat of internal ethnic conflicts
since the immediate post-independence era. These zones of turmoil have crucially
impinged on national security policy as well as external strategizing. As India
marches ahead to emerge as a major global power in the present century, with
boundless geo-political ambitions, committed strategic relations and a sharpened
framework of foreign policy, the ongoing internal ethnic conflicts are likely to
pose a retarding influence for dual broad reasons. First, they often become a
source of friction with India’s immediate neighbours in South Asia. Second, they
jettison India’s domestic stability, questioning the credibility of her image as a
‘consolidated’ democracy.
The concept of securitization pioneered by the Copenhagen School of Security
Studies has theorized the state’s predilection to tackle perceived threats to national
security through measures that are beyond the normal bounds of political proce-
dures. Since India has historically both used, and justified the use of, armed forces
to tackle insurgencies as existential threats to national security, the paper argues
that the Indian state has in fact, securitized its internal ethnic conflicts, thereby
establishing a theoretical link between securitization and internal ethnic conflicts
in a particular context (Indian insurgencies). The efficacy of such state securitiza-
tion demand an audit though, as in many cases conflicts still simmer despite
prolonged periods of armed state response. The situation in various parts of India
like Kashmir and the Northeast, where tensions spurted immediately after inde-
pendence, are cases in point. Insurgent activity for Greater Nagaland in the north-
east of India continues for more than 60 years now and has witnessed a prolonged
bloody armed conflict between the Naga rebels and the Indian armed security
personnel. The Naga insurgency is also India’s first experiment in armed interven-
tion and counter-insurgency operations; a reality which at once renders stark the
prolonged period of state securitization in motion.
Taking cue from this reality of a conflict much discussed and yet unresolved,
and articulating arguments within the theoretical premise of securitization of
internal ethnic conflicts, the present paper takes a closer look at the dynamics of
the Naga imbroglio. The paper adopts a two-pronged investigative framework.
The first examines why the Indian state adopted the securitization approach in the
Naga case. These are tackled by the first three sections of the paper. The theoret-
ical meaning and scope of securitization (as conceptualized by the Copenhagen
School) and its causal link with the problem of internal ethnic conflicts are exam-
ined in the first section. The Indian case and the making of the Naga crisis are
contextualized to delineate the chasm between the project of nation-building of
the post-colonial Indian state and the Nagas’ resistance to assimilation on grounds
of ethnic, historical and geographical isolation. The contending perspectives on

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