Writ Petition No. 2814 of 2015. Case: Smita Rajendra Kadu Vs The State of Maharashtra and Ors.. High Court of Bombay (India)
| Case Number | Writ Petition No. 2814 of 2015 |
| Counsel | For Appellant: Anil V. Anturkar, Senior Advocate and Sandeep Phatak i/by Sugandh B. Deshmukh, Advs. and For Respondents: P.G. Sawant, AGP |
| Judges | S. C. Dharmadhikari and B. P. Colabawalla, JJ. |
| Issue | Constitution of India - Articles 14, 16, 16(1), 16(4), 226, 234, 311, 335 |
| Judgement Date | December 23, 2015 |
| Court | High Court of Bombay (India) |
Judgment:
S. C. Dharmadhikari, J.
1. Rule. Learned counsel for the Respondents waive service. By consent, the Rule is made returnable forthwith. The writ petition is taken up for hearing and final disposal, by consent and on the request of learned counsel.
2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner challenges the order dated 12 August 2014. By that order, a copy of which is annexed at Annexure-A, page 19 of the writ petition, the services of the Petitioner have come to an end meaning thereby she is discharged from the judicial service.
3. The Petitioner states that the Respondents before us namely Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the authorities who appointed the Petitioner in judicial service by virtue of Maharashtra Judicial Service Rules, 2008. They have passed the impugned order on the recommendations of Respondent No. 3.
4. In paragraph 2 of this writ petition, it is stated that by invoking Rule 13(4)(ii)(b) of the Maharashtra Judicial Service Rules, 2008 ('the Rules'), the probation period of the Petitioner has been terminated and this action, by which the services have been brought to an end abruptly, violates the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
5. For appreciating the contentions raised by Mr. Anturkar, Senior Advocate, appearing for the Petitioner, we would have to note the full facts. The applications for appointment to the post of direct District Judges were invited by an advertisement dated 28 July 2008. The Petitioner applied in pursuance of this advertisement. After the results of an examination were declared in March-2010, the interviews of the eligible candidates were held. Out of 268 candidates, only 14 were eligible. The Petitioner being one of them was called for interview and ultimately came to be selected. The Petitioner states that she belongs to Scheduled Caste category. After her successful completion of the examinations and the oral interview, a letter was received by her which was appointing her to the post of Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai. Thus, the Petitioner joined the judicial service on 12 October 2010 as a Judge of the Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court. She states that after completion of all the formalities, she received her salary and thereafter she was posted at Dindoshi (Mumbai Suburban District). While in service at Dindoshi and functioning as a Judge of City Civil and Sessions Court, her services were transferred to Pandharpur. She therefore took over as a District Judge, at Pandharpur. She was designated as District Judge-I. She relies upon a communication in that behalf dated 22 October 2014.
6. The Petitioner then complains that she successfully worked at both the places and it is in that background that her challenge to the impugned order be appreciated.
7. Mr. Anturkar would submit that Petitioner's initial appointment was on probation for two years. That probation period commenced from 12 October 2010 and ended on 11 October 2012. Six months before the end of the probation period namely by 11 April 2012, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein considered the suitability for being appointed and to hold the post. She is not aware whether any of these Respondents applied their mind to the relevant factors. However, Mr. Anturkar states that the Petitioner received a letter dated 21 July 2012 from the Principal Judge, Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court and she complied with the requisitions contained therein. The Petitioner in paragraph 18 places reliance on Rule 13(4)(ii) of the Rules to urge that if the appointing authority finds that the person is not suitable to hold the post to which he or she was appointed or promoted, then, a reversion can be effected, meaning thereby a person can be reverted to the post held prior to the promotion or, if he is a probationary officer, discharge him or her from service. The impression of the Petitioner was that since nothing was communicated to her, her probation period is successfully completed. However, it is only when the order impugned in this petition was served upon her that she realized that though her probation period was to end on 11 October 2012, it was extended by two years.
8. It is in these circumstances that it is submitted that the impugned order cannot be said to be termination or discharge simplicitor of a probationer from service. This is an order founded on misconduct and, therefore, casts a stigma on the Petitioner's conduct and character. Such an order could not have been passed unless an opportunity of being heard was granted to the Petitioner. That prior opportunity not being given, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside.
9. It is next contended by Mr. Anturkar that during the course of probation, if there is any error or mistake committed and that is reported, then, an opportunity or chance to improve ought to be given to a Presiding Officer like the Petitioner. They should not be visited with extreme consequences. A judicial officer expects protection from the High Court. A judicial officer also expects guidance from his/her superiors. A judicial officer would also expect that in the event any complaint is received against him or her, the High Court would protect such officer and not entertain every vague or general complaint. Our attention is invited by Mr. Anturkar to page 98 of the paper book in this behalf. He would submit that the Reporting Officer namely the Principal Judge of the Bombay City Civil and Sessions Court has written Annual Confidential Remarks ('ACRs'). It has been observed by her that there are complaints about Petitioner's integrity and of pronouncing the judgments without dictating them. Mr. Anturkar submitted that these observations in the ACRs have been highlighted and they have influenced the decision of Respondent No. 3. These remarks and highlighted as above, were placed before the Hon'ble Guardian Judge. The Hon'ble Guardian Judge has opined that the Petitioner's performance is not satisfactory. Hence, she may be discharged from the service. Mr. Anturkar states that these recommendations of the Guardian Judge, when placed with the prefatory comment of the registry before a Committee of the Judges, it is apparent that the said Committee was also influenced to a great extent by the complaints and in that regard our attention is invited to page 103 of the paper book.
10. Thus, Mr. Anturkar would submit that the order is founded on complaints and charges of corruption or lack of integrity. If there are adverse remarks and the allegations in that behalf have a definite bearing in reaching the ultimate conclusion, then, it is apparent that this is not a case of termination simplicitor. The foundation being a misconduct and of serious nature, the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is then incumbent upon the Respondents to hold an inquiry so as to determine the guilt, if any, of the Petitioner. For all these reasons, it is submitted that the impugned order be quashed and set aside.
11. One more submission of Mr. Anturkar deserves to be noted, though there is no foundation laid for the same in the pleadings. It is submitted that the Petitioner, a lady judicial officer and belonging to Scheduled Caste, has been victimized and deliberately chosen for this treatment. Her superiors have ignored this fact and instead of protecting her and allowing her an opportunity to improve her performance, chose to dispense with her services. This amounts to serious miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that there is no assurance to the judicial officers after they sacrifice their careers as advocates and join the judicial service. If they join the judicial service with great hopes and aspirations that they would be protected and guided by the High Court, then, they are belied in the present case as the Petitioner is discharged from judicial service. All the more...
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