Moeed Yusuf. 2018. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia.
| Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Author | Syed Jaleel Hussain |
| Published date | 01 December 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797020962701 |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
Moeed Yusuf. 2018. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US
Crisis Management in South Asia. Stanford University Press, 320 pp.
ISBN 978-1-5036-0485-8.
The nuclearisation of South Asia changed the nature of regional strategic dynamics
in a number of ways. At the regional level, it led to the establishment of deterrence
between India and Pakistan that redefined the nature of strategic interactions
between them. A conventionally superior India had to factor in nuclear weapons
before any strategic moves against Pakistan. The nuclearisation of South Asia
evidently paid more security dividends to a conventionally weaker Pakistan.
There is, however, no consensus on the impact of nuclearisation on security and
strategic stability in the region (Ganguly, 2008; Kapur, 2007).
Besides the changed bilateral dynamics, South Asia’s nuclearisation created an
unprecedented great power interest in strategic developments in the region.
Though the international community was also concerned about the safety of
nuclear weapons in Pakistan where non-state actors continue to flourish, their
interest was primarily aimed at arresting the escalation of any regional crisis to a
nuclear level. The distinctive mediatory role played by the United States in all the
major crises between India and Pakistan after 1998 is indicative of this concern.
Arguably, in the absence of the United States, these crises had the potential to
escalate to the nuclear level. Therefore, an understanding of the role played by the
United States, including its motives and interests becomes extremely important.
So far, most of the literature on these crises has focused either on the causes or the
outcomes. Yusuf’s book, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments, is a novel
attempt to theorise the role of third party in crises in a nuclearised South Asia.
At a conceptual level, Yusuf’s book makes some valuable contributions. First,
the crisis bargaining in south Asia is tripartite not bilateral. In spite of India’s
‘fetish of bilateralism’ that involves deeply ingrained reservations with third-party
mediation in any of the disputes with its neighbours, Indian leaders have actively
sought the US involvement in India–Pakistan crisis after 1998. This includes
Kargil crisis of 1999, Twin Peaks crisis of 2001–2002 and Mumbai crisis of 2008.
Second, Yusuf’s ‘Brokered Bargaining’ model (BBM) is a theory of process
not causation. It is also noteworthy as the only model looking at the actual
procedure and dynamics of crisis bargaining in South Asia. The book’s tripartite
bargaining model departs from the literature on crises dynamics between nuclear
rivals focusing upon dyads. The key strength of the book is showing how a
triangular dynamic works in practice. Drawing on Crawford’s work on pivotal
deterrence that largely focuses on crises between non-nuclear rivals, Yusuf argues
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
7(3) 387 –396, 2020
The Author 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/2347797020962701
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