Iran’s Policy towards Afghanistan
| Author | Shahram Akbarzadeh |
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797013518402 |
| Date | 01 April 2014 |
| Published date | 01 April 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Iran’s Policy towards
Afghanistan: In the
Shadow of the
United States
Shahram Akbarzadeh1
Abstract
The fall of the Taliban in 2001 presented Iran with a complex strategic situa-
tion. On the one hand, the removal of the Taliban promised to open up new
opportunities for Iran to expand its influence, based on historical and cultural ties
between Iran and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the 2001 operation brought
the United States (US) to the region. The large scale entrenchment of US troops
on the eastern borders of Iran presented tangible security risks, dominating Iran’s
strategic outlook. The closure of the US base in Uzbekistan and the planned
withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan have offered an opportunity to policy
makers in Iran to recalibrate bilateral relations with Afghanistan. But the Iranian
leadership appears too slow in readjusting its strategic outlook, keeping Iran’s
policy towards Afghanistan hostage to its hostility towards the US.
Keywords
Iranian foreign policy, Afghanistan, Constructivism, Realism, United States
Introduction
The fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 offered Iran an unexpected oppor-
tunity to repair its relations with its eastern neighbour and expand its influence.
The Taliban had been vehemently anti-Shia and anti-Iran during its 5-year rule. In
1998, following the killing of eight Iranian diplomats in Mazer-e Sharif, Iran
mobilized troops on the Iran-Afghan border, leading to nervous speculation about
an impending war. The fall of the Taliban ended a tense phase in relations between
Iran and Afghanistan. Yet it has not heralded a close bilateral partnership. Instead
Iran is reported to pursue a contradictory, even confused, policy in Afghanistan,
Article
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
1(1) 63–78
2014 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2347797013518402
http://aia.sagepub.com
Shahram Akbarzadeh, Centre for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University,
Burwood, Australia. Email: shahram.akbarzadeh@deakin.edu.au; Web: http://www.deakin.
edu.au/arts-ed/centre-for-citizenship-and-globalisation/research/research-projects/islam-
in-irans-foreign-policy
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 1 (2014): 63–78
64 Shahram Akbarzadeh
arming rival leaders and remnants of the Taliban while providing financial aid
directly to the presidential office. How may this contradictory approach be under-
stood? How does Iran view its interests in Afghanistan and how does it pursue
them? The missing piece of this jigsaw is the United States (US). The fall of the
Taliban was due to a massive US operation which brought US troops to Central
Asia. This resulted in the stationing of US troops right next to Iran, as well as the
establishment of military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This military pres-
ence has made a significant impact on Iran’s risk assessment and adversely
affected its ability to capitalize on new opportunities in Afghanistan.
This article examines Tehran’s behaviour and attitude towards Afghanistan
between 2001 and 2012. In this period Iran went through a change of government.
The rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the office of presidency in 2005 reflected
the ascendancy of political conservatism among the elite and widespread disillu-
sionment with the reformist President Mohammad Khatami. The demise of
Khatami and his brainchild ‘dialogue of civilizations’, which was aimed at build-
ing bridges of trust and confidence between Iran and the US, may be attributed to
the seismic implications of the September 11 attacks. The War on Terror, which led
to regime changes on either side of Iran and Washington’s hardened position on the
Islamic regime in Iran made it impossible for Khatami to pursue his reform agenda.
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad adopted a much more aggressive pos-
ture towards the US, mirroring George W. Bush’s Iran policy. Heightened concerns
with US plans were the all-consuming feature of Ahmadinejad’s presidency.
It is doubtful that the US ever intended to use Afghanistan as a springboard for
regime change in Iran. But that impression weighed heavily on the minds of the
Iranian leadership, as their repeated protests about the continued US presence in
Afghanistan suggests. That strategic concern with the US provided the backdrop
for relations between Iran and Afghanistan. Iran’s position on Afghanistan did not
experience change with the commencement of the Ahmadinejad government, a
further indication of a shared view on the fundamental geostrategic assessments
of the region.
This article examines the explanatory merits of two key International relations
(IR) approaches to Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan. After exploring fluctuations
in Iran’s position, the article concludes that while Realism and Constructivism
both offer insights into Iran’s foreign policy making dynamics, neither has the
exclusive capacity to offer a coherent account of Iran’s approach to Afghanistan.
Instead Iran’s policy appears to be influenced by a mix of both geostrategic and
ideational priorities, each balancing and keeping the other in check.
Approaches to Iranian Foreign Policy
The literature on Iranian foreign policy making is generally divided between
Realism and Constructivism. The realist approach presents Iran as a rational and
pragmatic actor in the international domain. Iran’s foreign policy choices are
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