Enter the Vanguard State: Reinterpreting ASEAN’s Response to the South China Sea Issue

AuthorNicholas Khoo,Laura Southgate
Published date01 August 2016
DOI10.1177/2347797016645454
Date01 August 2016
Subject MatterArticles
Enter the Vanguard State:
Reinterpreting ASEAN’s
Response to the South
China Sea Issue
Laura Southgate1
Nicholas Khoo2
Abstract
This article analyzes the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) inter-
actions with China over the South China Sea issue since the end of the Cold
War. A neorealist understanding of ASEAN’s international relations is advanced.
This approach highlights the degree of security maximizing interest convergence
between key ASEAN actors and an extra-regional actor, the United States, to
explain the varying outcomes in the empirical record. Our approach is con-
trasted to alternatives in the existing literature that either overemphasize or
underemphasize ASEAN’s autonomy in regional politics.
Keywords
ASEAN, South China Sea, regional autonomy, Vanguard State Theory, external
interference
Introduction
A notable development in Asian international relations studies since the end of the
Cold War has been the development of a significant body of theoretical literature to
explain the evolution of ASEAN. Thus, analysts have debated whether ASEAN is
a security community (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Emmers, 2012; Khoo, 2015)
engaged in theoretical reflections on the relevance of non-material as opposed to
material determinants in regional affairs (Jones & Smith, 2006, 2007a, 2007b;
1 Department of Defence and International Affairs, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,
Camberley, Surrey, UK.
2 Department of Politics, University of Otago, New Zealand.
Corresponding author:
Nicholas Khoo, 4 North 4 Arts (Burns) Building, Department of Politics, University of Otago, P.O.
Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
E-mail: nicholas.khoo@otago.ac.nz
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
3(2) 221–244
2016 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797016645454
http://aia.sagepub.com
Article
222 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(2)
Peou, 2002), and considered whether the region or the state is the appropriate level
of analysis (Ba, 2009; Jones, 2012; Jones & Smith, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). This
article continues this debate. Its point of departure is the claim that while the
analysts cited above have considerably advanced the theoretical debate on the role
of ASEAN in regional politics, a gap remains. In particular, theorists have tended
to adopt unnecessarily polarized positions on ASEAN’s autonomy in regional
politics. On one hand, an identifiable group of theorists associated with construc-
tivist theory, have emphasized the organization’s autonomy from external inter-
ference (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009). On the other hand, theorists of a
realist and critical theory persuasion contend that ASEAN has highly circumscribed
autonomy from external interference (Jones, 2012; Jones & Smith, 2006, 2007a,
2007b). What has not been sufficiently explored is the conceptual space that exam-
ines the relationship between regional states and extra-regional states.
This article attempts to do precisely this, with reference to a case study of
ASEAN’s policy on the South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. It is our
contention that ASEAN’s record on the South China Sea is not adequately explained
by reference to existing perspectives. Instead, we seek to advance an alternative
explanation, rooted in neorealist theory, and to develop a theory of regional poli-
tics, which involves the interaction between ASEAN as an organization and the
ASEAN vanguard state(s) in respect to the South China Sea issue. According to
this vanguard state theory, ASEAN’s autonomy is a contingent one, reflecting the
interests of what we call a vanguard state and an extra-regional state, in this case,
the United States. Thus, ASEAN’s travails with China over the South China Sea
are a reflection of its vanguard states’ inability to secure external great power actor
guarantees to counter China’s territorial advances. To the extent ASEAN has made
some limited progress in defending its regional autonomy from China’s interven-
tion since 2013, it is a consequence of a convergence of interests between its
vanguard states and an external actor, the US, all of whom have agency.
Contending Explanations
There are three existing explanations that are relevant to explaining ASEAN’s
policy on the South China Sea since the end of the Cold War. The first of these
approaches, represented by the constructivist perspective, has emphasized
ASEAN’s ability to uphold the principle of regional autonomy from external
interference by external powers (Acharya, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Ba, 2009; Haacke,
2003). A second approach, reflected in the realist school, takes a contrary stance.
According to this view, ASEAN has severely limited ability to uphold regional
autonomy from external interference (Jones & Smith, 2002, 2006, 2007a, 2007b;
Leifer, 1991, 1999, 2000). A third approach, associated with critical theory, also
views ASEAN’s autonomy as limited, but in a different way from realists. Here,
outcomes are contingent on intra-state struggle between socio-political forces
(Jones, 2012). As our analysis will show, each of these explanations has limita-
tions. In this article, we offer an alternative understanding, rooted in neorealist
theory, where ASEAN’s autonomy is highly dependent on the convergence of
interests between ASEAN and an external actor.

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