Comrades in Arms
| Date | 01 August 2014 |
| Author | Alexey D. Muraviev |
| Published date | 01 August 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797014536638 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Comrades in Arms: The
Military-Strategic Aspects
of China–Russia Relations
Alexey D. Muraviev*
Abstract
Within less than two decades China achieved a considerable qualitative leap in
capability acquisition and development that allowed the nation to transform its
military from being a technologically backward army of peasant draftees into a
technologically advanced fighting force. One of the key determinants behind this
success story—the Sino-Russian military cooperation and its real extent—has
been largely ignored. Yet, the relationship with Russia in the sphere of security and
defence allowed the People’s Liberation Army to reduce the capability gap with
other regional powers and to launch a strategic push into Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean region. The current state of Sino-Russia defence relations has not
reached a status of a fully grown military alliance. Nevertheless, it has a profound
impact on China’s strategic agenda and regional behaviour and has become one
of key determinants of regional security in Northeast and Central Asia.
Keywords
Russia, China, defence, military–technological cooperation, maritime security
Introduction
The second decade of the new millennium has been marked by the continuous anal-
ysis of the evolving political–military environment in the shaky Indo-Pacific geo-
political system with the power rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) being
one of the most debated points. In particular, the rise of PRC’s military might, its
intent to acquire strategic reach and the grown ability to deploy offensive military
power in the maritime domain, among other contributing factors, have been linked
to a growing view of China as a new superpower of the twenty-first century.
Article
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
1(2) 163–185
2014 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2347797014536638
http://aia.sagepub.com
*Alexey D. Muraviev is Head of the Department of Social Sciences and International
Studies at Curtin University, Perth, Australia. He is the Coordinator of the International
Relations and National Security Programmes and the Founding Director of the Strategic
Flashlight forum on national security and strategy at Curtin. He can be contacted at:
A.Muraviev@curtin.edu.au
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 163–185
164 Alexey D. Muraviev
Indeed, within less than two decades, the PRC achieved a considerable qualita-
tive leap in capability acquisition and development that allowed the nation to
transform its military from being a technologically backward army of peasant
draftees into a technologically advanced fighting force. One of the key determi-
nants behind this success story—the Sino-Russian military cooperation and its
real extent—has been largely ignored. Yet, the relationship with Russia in the
sphere of security and defence allowed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to
reduce the capability gap with other regional powers and to launch a strategic
push into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
From Nerchinsk to Damanskiy and Cam Ranh Bay
The current state of bilateral strategic relations between Russia and the PRC, par-
ticularly in such sensitive sphere of cooperation as security and defence, as well as
future of this vector needs to be considered in the historical context. Russia and
China share not just one of the world’s longest land borders but also a 400-year-old
history, which is as complex and often controversial as national histories of both
great powers. The fierce proponents of strong bilateral relations often underline the
unique nature of Sino-Russia relations. For example, one of Russia’s leading
experts on China, Myasnikov, made a symptomatic comment by pointing out that
despite some trouble moments in the history of bilateral relations the ‘two nations
were never in a state of war with each other’ (Myasnikov, 2000, p. 127).
Relations between these two great powers were first seriously tested in the late
seventeenth century, when the Russian empire began its first strategic push east-
wards with an aim to gain uninterrupted access to the sea, a strategic imperative
that was clearly understood by Russia’s first Emperor, Peter the Great. However,
the prospect of Russia’s emergence as a Pacific power caused some serious con-
cern in the neighbouring Chinese empire, which, by threat of military action,
forced the Russians to sign the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 (Gromyko, Kovalev,
Sevostianov & Tikhvinsky, 1986, p. 280). In the face of overwhelming Chinese
military superiority (Mitchell, 1974, p. 41), Russia agreed to abandon its settle-
ments along the Amur River. Two centuries later, Russian diplomacy was able to
secure two important treaties of Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860), allowing the
nation to access warm-sea ports on the Sea of Japan and began a concerted naval
build-up. In June 1860, the military post of Vladivostok was founded on the
shores of the Golden Horn Bay, becoming Russia’s principal commercial seaport
and the main naval base in the Pacific in 1871 (Pryamitskiy, 2000, p. 85). Thirty
years later, in 1898, Russia leased from China the Liaotung Peninsula along with
a seaport at Port Arthur for a period of 25 years (Zakharov, Bagrov, Beve,
Zakharov & Kotukhov, 1973, p. 32). The ice-free Port Arthur, quickly converted
into Russia’s main Pacific naval base, complemented the growth of Russian naval
power in the Far East. The leasing of Port Arthur was the first strategic agreement
between Russia and China in the field of national security and defence.
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