Australian and Southeast Asian Perspectives on China’s Military Modernization
| Published date | 01 August 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797014536637 |
| Date | 01 August 2014 |
| Author | Pradeep Taneja |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Australian and Southeast
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
Asian Perspectives
1(2) 145–162
2014 SAGE Publications India
on China’s Military
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
Modernization
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2347797014536637
http://aia.sagepub.com
Pradeep Taneja
Abstract
China’s rapid military modernization has elicited a variety of responses from
governments in the region. This article looks at the responses from Australia
and two ASEAN states: Indonesia and Singapore. These states have been
chosen because they have little or no territorial disputes with China that might
influence their attitude towards China’s military modernization. This article
argues that China’s military modernization is not driven solely by the pursuit
of national reunification but has more to do with the nature of Sino-US com-
petition and China’s ambition to eventually replace the United States as the
dominant power in the region. It is this competition that provides the rationale
for Chinese military planners to seek to expand and modernize their military
capabilities. And it is China’s spectacular economic rise that provides the finan-
cial means toward that end. The United States, in turn, has responded with its
‘pivot’ to Asia to reassure its allies and partners in the region of its determina-
tion to maintain its hegemonic position in the region. But not all states in the
Asia Pacific region have been equally worried about China’s military moderniza-
tion. In examining the responses of three different states with varying degrees
of security links with the United States, this article will attempt to identify
the similarities and differences in the way regional powers have responded to
China’s rise. In doing so, it will shed light on the future shape of the security
order in East Asia.
Keywords
China, Australia, Southeast Asia, military, modernization, transformation
Pradeep Taneja, Lecturer in Asian Politics and International Relations, School of Social
and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He is also a Fellow of
the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne. He can be contacted at:
ptaneja@unimelb.edu.au
146
Pradeep Taneja
Introduction
China’s economic transformation from an insular and poverty-stricken country to
becoming the world’s second-largest economy has placed unprecedented finan-
cial resources at the disposal of the Chinese state. While at the beginning of the
country’s economic reform programme in the late-1970s, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) had to undergo a major reduction in its force size; the economic suc-
cess wrought by those reforms has made the PLA one of the main beneficiaries in
the jostling for resources among the various arms of the party state. Jolted by the
stunning displays of American military power and technological sophistication
during the two Gulf Wars, the Chinese military embarked on a major drive to
modernize and expand the country’s defence capability through indigenous devel-
opment and foreign acquisition. However, until the 2008 global financial crisis
(GFC), China had taken a generally conciliatory approach in its relations with its
neighbours and other major world powers. This was based on the now-famous
strategic TaoguangYanghui1 advice of the paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, to
keep a low profile and not get entangled in conflicts because China’s economic
reform policy required a peaceful regional and international environment. China’s
more forceful handling of territorial disputes in East and South China Seas would
suggest that this approach has now changed.
The economic and political difficulties faced by the United States and its
European allies in the wake of the GFC seem to have convinced China’s leaders
and strategic planners that the US power is on the decline. A corollary of this view
is the belief that China should be prepared to challenge American power in the
region whenever it is safe to do so. A sense of its rising power has also led China
to take a more assertive approach in dealing with long-dormant territorial disputes
with its neighbours. China’s neighbours in the region have responded to China’s
rise in a variety of ways. This article looks at the responses of three important
countries in the region. The article begins with a discussion of China’s self-
perception as a rising power and how the country has tried to frame it for the
world before focusing on its military dimension. It will then examine the perspec-
tives of Indonesia, Singapore and Australia on China’s military modernization,
using a framework that considers three important factors in analyzing national
responses to China’s military modernization: strategic concerns, economic inter-
dependence and domestic politics.
‘Peaceful Rise’ or ‘Peaceful Development’?
In order to understand how China’s neighbours are reacting to China’s military
modernization, it is useful to consider how China wants the world to view its rise.
China’s leaders have attempted to carefully craft a narrative that portrays China’s
rise as beneficial to everyone, especially to its neighbours and other developing
countries. This narrative is an important part of China’s rising international status,
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 145–162
China’s Military Modernization 147
which is seen as something that can lead to power, security and respect, confirm-
ing the country’s status as a responsible great power. A great deal of effort goes
into projecting China’s rise as a win-win outcome for any country that engages it
economically, diplomatically or strategically. Any attempt to portray China as a
threat is swiftly and firmly rejected. It was this outlook that necessitated the
change in the language used to describe China’s emergence as a rising power from
‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’.
Peaceful Rise
The term ‘peaceful rise’ became part of China’s foreign policy lexicon following
Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at Harvard University in 2003. It was meant to
project China’s rise as ‘opportunity’ rather than a ‘threat’. China will rise peace-
fully and play an important regional and global role without resorting to force
(Xing, 2007).
A key proponent of the ‘peaceful rise’ idea was Zheng Bijian, the Chairman of
the China Reform Forum, who had previously held senior positions within the
Central Party School and the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist
Party. Zheng argued that China’s peaceful rise would be achieved through engage-
ment with, not isolation from or confrontation with, powers that shape economic
globalization (Zheng, 2005, pp. 18–24): ‘In pursuing the goal of rising in peace,
the Chinese leadership has strived for improving China’s relations with all the
nations of the world’, he wrote (Zheng, 2005, p. 21).
The underlying message that Zheng tried to communicate was that China seeks
a peaceful international environment, not to challenge other powers. This was also
consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s advice mentioned above. Zheng stressed that
this is both a domestic project and an international project, and that it needs the
support of other countries to help create an international environment where
China’s peaceful rise can be accommodated. In order to rise peacefully, Zheng
argued, China needed to do three things: (i) develop a new model of industrializa-
tion that does not rely on rivalry for resources and environmental degradation;
(ii) find a new form of great power transition and (iii) build a harmonious socialist
society. Zheng linked the peaceful rise concept with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘peace and
development’ idea: ‘China’s development depends on world peace—a peace that
its development will in turn reinforce’ (Zheng, 2005, p. 24).
Peaceful Development
While Chinese officials and media were still developing and promoting the idea
of ‘peaceful rise’, the phrase itself became contentious within China and was
substituted by a new catchphrase, ‘peaceful development’, although both phrases
continue to be used interchangeably. A number of factors contributed to that
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1, 2 (2014): 145–162
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Pradeep Taneja
switch, mainly to do with a lack of consensus on China’s future role as a great
power. But perhaps the main reason why the word ‘rise’ was replaced with ‘devel-
opment’ had to do with China seeking to project its rise as being different from
other historical examples of power transition, which, as realist scholars such as
Mearsheimer (2003) have pointed out, are seldom peaceful. The use of the phrase
‘peaceful development’ underscores the point that China is still a developing
country that needs a stable and peaceful international environment to continue to
develop. In this way, China’s domestic development is inextricably linked with
global development, and the interests of China are linked with the interests of
all people.
History is often used as a reminder that China is not ‘rising’ for the first time;
that historically it was a great power with a highly developed civilization, which
unlike Western powers, did not go colonizing the world. China’s peaceful rise and
development is articulated as simply a part of regaining its rightful place in the
global order, following a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers.
Representations of China as a ‘threat’ and policies of foreign powers that...
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