Civil Appeal No. 10316 of 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15927 of 2008). Case: Tribhuvanshankar Vs Amrutlal. Supreme Court (India)
| Case Number | Civil Appeal No. 10316 of 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15927 of 2008) |
| Judges | Anil R. Dave and Dipak Misra, JJ. |
| Issue | Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 - Sections 2, 11(1), 12(1), 91; Court Fees Act, 1870; Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982; Rent Act; Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950; Indian Limitation Act - Section 28; Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 - ... |
| Judgement Date | November 13, 2013 |
| Court | Supreme Court (India) |
Judgment:
Dipak Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in Second Appeal No. 33 of 1995 passed on 8.2.2008.
3. The Appellant-Plaintiff instituted Civil Suit No. 259A/86 in the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Mhow, District Indore, for eviction of the Respondent-Defendant from the suit-premises and for mesne profits. The case of the Appellant-Plaintiff was that he had purchased the suit property vide registered sale deed dated 1.4.1976 on payment of sale consideration of Rs. 4500/- to the vendor, one Kishanlal. The Respondent-Defendant was in possession of the said suit property as a tenant under the earlier owner Kishorilal on payment of rent of Rs. 15/- per month. It was averred in the plaint that it was an oral tenancy and after acquiring the title the Appellant informed the Respondent about the sale by the earlier owner. Despite assurance given by the Respondent to pay the rent to him, it was not honoured which compelled the Appellant to send a notice on 14.12.1977 and, eventually, he terminated the tenancy with effect from 31.1.1978. The Respondent, as pleaded, had replied to the notice stating, inter alia, that the Appellant was neither the landlord nor the owner of the property. On the contrary, it was stated in the reply that the Respondent was the owner of the premises.
4. The grounds that were urged while seeking eviction were: (i) the Defendant was in arrears of rent since 1.4.1976 and same was demanded vide notice dated 14.12.1977, which was received on 3.1.1978 and despite receiving the notice, the Defendant defaulted by not paying the rent within two months; (ii) that the said accommodation was bona fide required by the Plaintiff for construction of his house and the accommodation is an open land; (iii) the said accommodation was bona fide required by the Plaintiff for general merchant shop i.e. non-residential purpose and for the said purpose the Plaintiff did not have any alternative accommodation in his possession in Mhow City.
5. In the written statement, the Defendant disputed the right, title and interest of the Plaintiff, and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. That apart, a further stand was taken that the Appellant had no right under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act") to file the suit for eviction. It was set forth by the Respondent-Defendant that he was never a tenant under Kishorilal and, in fact, the accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and a 'banjar' land and the Respondent was in possession for 18 to 19 years and it was to the knowledge of Kishorilal and his elder brother. For the purpose of business he had constructed a Gumti, got the gate fixed and when the business relating to sale of furniture commenced there was no objection from Kishorilal or his brother or any family member. The possession, as put forth by the Respondent, was uninterrupted, peaceful and to the knowledge of Kishorilal who was the actual owner. It was also set forth that when Kishorilal desired to sell the premises, he was put to notice about the ownership of the Defendant but he sold the property without obtaining sale consideration with the sole intention to obtain possession by colluding with the Appellant-Plaintiff. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the premises is situate in the Cantonment area and the Cantonment Board has the control over the land and neither Kishorilal nor the Appellant had any title to the same.
6. The learned trial Judge framed as many as 26 issues. The relevant issues are, whether the suit accommodation was taken on rent by the Defendant for running his wood business in the year 1973 from the earlier landlord Kishorilal; whether Defendant is in continuous, unobstructed and peaceful possession since 18 years which was within the knowledge of Kishorilal, his elder brother and their family members; whether Defendant had become owner of the suit accommodation by way of adverse possession; and whether the sale deed had been executed without any consideration for causing damage to the title of Defendant.
7. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of evidence brought on record, came to hold that the sale deed executed by Kishorilal in favour of the Appellant was without any sale consideration; that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties had not been established; and that the Respondent had become the owner of the suit accommodation on the basis of adverse possession. Being of this view, the trial court dismissed the suit.
8. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree the Plaintiff preferred Civil Regular Appeal No. 5 of 1994 and the lower appellate court, reappreciating the evidence on record and considering the submissions raised at the bar, came to hold that the Appellant- Plaintiff had not been able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant; that the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge that the sale-deed dated 1.4.1976 due to absence of sale consideration was invalid, was neither justified nor correct; and that there being no clinching evidence to establish that the Defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge on that score was indefensible. After so holding, the learned appellate Judge proceeded to hold that as the Plaintiff had established his title and the Defendant had miserably failed to substantiate his assertion as regards the claim of perfection of title by way of adverse possession, the Plaintiff on the basis of his ownership was entitled to a decree for possession. To arrive at the said conclusion he placed reliance on Punia Pillai v. Panai Minor through Pandiya Thevan AIR 1947 Madras 282, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul AIR 1966 SC 735 and Amulya Ratan Mukherjee and Ors. v. Kali Pada Tah and Ors. AIR 1975 Cal 200.
9. Facing failure before the appellate court the Defendant preferred Second Appeal No. 33 of 1995 before the High Court. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: -
(1) Whether a decree could be passed in favour of Plaintiff though such Plaintiff fails to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
(2) Whether the 1st Appellate Court committed the error of law in pronouncing the error of law in pronouncing the judgment and decree on question of title? And
(3) Whether the 1st Appellate Court has erred in law in holding that the possession of the Defendant is not proved and that the Defendant has not acquired the title by adverse possession?
10. The learned single Judge by judgment dated 8.2.2008 adverted to Sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(e) of the Act and came to hold that once the Plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant which is the sine qua non in a suit for eviction, the Plaintiff could not have fallen back on his title to seek eviction of the tenant. Be it noted, the learned single Judge placed reliance upon Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad and another AIR 2002 SC 136 wherein the decision in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) had been distinguished. The learned single Judge dislodged the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court and affirmed that of the learned trial Judge.
11. We have heard Mr. A.K. Chitale, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Mr. Puneet Jain, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent.
12. Questioning the legal acceptableness of the decision of the High Court the learned senior Counsel has raised the following contentions: -
(a) The learned single Judge has erroneously opined that a suit cannot be decreed by civil court for possession on the basis of general title even if the landlord-tenant relationship is not proved. A manifest error has been committed by the learned Judge not following the law laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) which is applicable on all fours to the case at hand, solely on the ground that the said decision has been distinguished in Rajendra Tiwary's case.
(b) Though three substantial questions of law were framed, yet the learned single Judge without considering all the questions affirmed the judgment of the trial court wherein it had come to hold that the Defendant had established his title by adverse possession despite the same had already been annulled on reappreciation of evidence by the lower appellate court.
(c) Assuming a conclusion is arrived at that there should have been a prayer for recovery of possession by paying the requisite court fee, the Appellant, who has been fighting the litigation since decades should be allowed to amend the plaint and on payment of requisite court fee apposite relief should be granted.
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