Why Does North Korea Engage in Provocations?
| Author | Ashley A.C. Hess |
| Published date | 01 April 2018 |
| Date | 01 April 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/2347797017749044 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Why Does North Korea
Engage in Provocations?
Ashley A.C. Hess1
Abstract
Given the increasing number and severity of North Korean provocations, this
article quantitatively analyses the relationship between North Korean actions
and different types of events and actions taken by the international community
commonly described as ‘triggers’ for these provocations. A database of 257 possible
trigger events and 88 North Korean provocations, covering the period from
1 January 2012 through 21 November 2016, was developed for investigation.
Statistical analyses assessed correlations between specific types of trigger events
and North Korean provocations writ large as well as the specific level of provo-
cation. The article concludes that, despite media and academic assessments to
the contrary, the notional trigger events explored in this article appear to be
uncorrelated with either North Korea undertaking a provocation or its level of
severity. The strongest finding supports the concept of provocation cycles, in which
the clearest predictor of a North Korean provocation is simply whether or not
another provocation has recently taken place. Yet, the article also finds that in
these situations additional provocations may more likely be of a lower level, such
as short-range missile tests or limited naval incursions. International leaders’ deci-
sions should be informed by this apparent lack of significant correlation between
provocations and events such as USA–South Korean military exercises, United
Nations Security Council resolutions, or a high-level US visit to the region.
Keywords
North Korea, international conflict, military/armed forces, United States of
America (USA), South Korea, provocations
Introduction
Current understanding of the relationship between coercion, compellence and
North Korean behaviour is limited. For instance, when the United Nations adopts
Article
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
5(1) 57–83
2018 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797017749044
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent
the views or official policy of the U.S. government.
1
George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA.
Corresponding author:
Ashley A.C. Hess, George Mason University, 3351 Fairfax Dr, Arlington, VA 22201, USA.
E-mail: Ahess7@gmu.edu
58 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 5(1)
a Security Council resolution condemning the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), can we expect that North Korea will engage in a missile test, in a
show of anger and defiance? When the USA elects a new president, should we
anticipate a nuclear test around election or inauguration day, perhaps as a way for
North Korea to convince the new US leader of its importance? Or, perhaps, North
Korea would decide not to engage in a provocation, either because it accepts its
UN-mandated punishment or because the country wants to establish a good rela-
tionship with the new US administration. More broadly, are North Korean provo-
cations statistically correlated with US and international actions, following the
regime’s vociferous public announcements? Current literature on these issues
lacks a statistical basis to determine either the correlation or directionality of any
relationship between these types of events. Better insight and comprehension are
required for governments and policymakers to make informed decisions. The con-
sequences of miscalculation can be monumental, especially given North Korea’s
nuclear and growing ballistic missile capabilities.
North Korea is a desperately poor country with a population of 25 million
and an estimated GDP of US $40 billion. During the Cold War, the country was
subsidized by the Soviet Union and has been substantially supported by China
over the past several decades. Especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with
few allies left, Pyongyang began focusing increasing attention on expanding its
asymmetric capabilities. Pyongyang regards its advanced military weapons, in
particular ballistic missiles and nuclear arms, as integral for regime survival and
defence, deterrence of the USA contributing to its international prestige and
enhancing its ability to engage in coercive diplomacy, a bargaining chip, a cost-
effective equalizer in its competition with the ROK, and an opportunity to earn
hard currency through sales of these technologies, and boost the regime’s domes-
tic legitimacy (Armstrong, 2009; Burgess, 2012; Cha, 2002, 2009; Cordesman &
Hess, 2013a p. 7; 2013b, pp. 1, 36; Department of Defense [DOD], 2013; Kim,
1995; Roehrig, 2016; Weitz, 2016).
For decades, the North Korean regime has engaged in brinksmanship, engag-
ing in a series of provocations (Armstrong, 2009; Beck, 2011; Becker, 2005;
Bennett, 2009, 2012; Cha, 2009; Denmark, 2011; DOD, 2016; Kim, 1995;
Klingner, 2009; Lee, 2014; McDevitt, 2011). Then, with tensions high, having
gained an empowered position as well as the attention of the international com-
munity, North Korea tones down its provocations and agrees to negotiate in order
to temporarily defuse the situation. This can be followed by additional brinks-
manship over the negotiation itself, in which the DPRK demands more than it
was promised or does less than it agreed to (Cha, 2009, p. 128).
The DPRK has engaged in an increasing number of significant military provo-
cations, especially in the past several years under Kim Jong Un. The simplest
explanation for these provocations, especially advanced missile and nuclear tests,
is that they are conducted to improve North Korean capabilities; this may
well be true (Cha, 2009, p. 122; Cordesman, 2006; Dempsey, 2017; Gause, 2015,
p. 2; Lee, 2014, p. 93). However, this explanation does not account for the timing
of such tests, or the timing or reasoning behind other types of provocations like
incursions over the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas.
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