The Sino-Indian Rivalry and Balance-of-power Theory: Explaining India’s Underbalancing
| Published date | 01 December 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241282065 |
| Author | T. V. Paul |
| Date | 01 December 2024 |
Research Article
The Sino-Indian Rivalry
and Balance-of-power
Theory: Explaining
India’s Underbalancing
T. V. Paul1
Abstract
Balance-of-power theory has been challenged as insufficient for explaining state be-
haviour. Powerful anomalies for the theory exist, especially among states confront-
ing intense rivalry and war. One such anomaly is underbalancing in the Sino-Indian
rivalry by the Indian side up until 2017. Today India is still engaged in limited hard
balancing, relying on asymmetrical arms build-up and strategic partnership with the
United States and Japan that are not equal to military alignment. This article argues
that India has occasionally engaged in hard balancing, relying on arms build-up and
limited alliance formation, but in general, there has been a serious effort not to
resort to intense hard balancing by forming military alliances or symmetrical arms
build-up. This calls for an explanation. The core argument I make is that the type
of balancing is intimately related to the type of rivalry states have. The China–
India rivalry has yet to become an intense existential variety compared to the India–
Pakistan rivalry where existential security and protection of national identity
are of major concern. Indian elite’s perceptions of the non-existential character of
the Chinese threat and their reading of the Chinese strategy towards India have
been the primary factors in explaining India’s balancing response. In the latter, ac-
tive hard balancing has been occurring both internally and externally, whereas the
former is characterised by a combination of limited hard balancing, soft-balancing
and diplomatic engagement, components of a hedging strategy. The hard balancing
has picked up momentum since 2017 in response to a more assertive strategy of
the Xi Jinping regime as the Chinese government has ratcheted up military activity
on the India–China border. The general implication is that rivals who do not fear
existential threats need not engage in intense hard balancing. Perceptions of the
threat level play a bigger role in what kind of balancing behaviour occurs in inter-
national politics than acknowledged in standard theories on balance of power,
especially of the automatic balancing variety.
Keywords
India, China, Sino-India, balance of power
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
11(4) 451–474, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23477970241282065
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1 Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
Corresponding author:
T. V. Paul, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 2T7, Canada.
E-mail: t.paul@mcgill.ca
452 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(4)
Introduction
Balance of power has been a cardinal theory in international relations and per-
haps one of its oldest, predating the discipline itself. It is the foundation of for-
eign policy behaviour in the historical European great power system as well as
the IR theory of realism, both classical and neorealist versions (Kaufman et al.,
2007; Kissinger, 1995; Little, 2007; Sheehan, 1996). One of the recurring
themes in this context has been whether balance of power occurs automatically
in the face of power disequilibrium or it needs to be created manually (Elman,
2003; Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 13; Waltz, 1979, p. 127). The former assumes that
whenever a major imbalance occurs, weaker states flock together among them-
selves or with a stronger power so as to protect their sovereignty and security
(Waltz, 1979, p. 127). However, it has been challenged as an insufficient theo-
retical and policy mechanism for explaining state behaviour, especially among
those confronting rivalry and war. Powerful anomalies exist challenging the
theory, its core premises, and its universal application. For instance, in the post-
Cold War era, the United States emerged as the most powerful state, but no
hard-balancing coalition was formed against it to balance its power position or
its aggressive policies, especially in the Middle East. Only occasional soft-
balancing coalitions appeared (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Paul et al., 2004; Walt,
2005, 126–132; Wivel & Paul, 2020). This anomaly has continued to some
extent with respect to the rise of China. A powerful balancing coalition is yet to
form against China’s increasing power and aggressive behaviour on several
fronts. China’s expansive territorial claims against a number of states, espe-
cially through its island-building activity in the South China Sea and periodic
clashes with regional states, are cases in point. One such instance of underbal-
ancing is India’s balancing behaviour towards China. Underbalancing in the
automatic balancing perspective means whenever an imbalance occurs in the
power capabilities of two contending states or coalitions the weaker side would
either fail to balance internally by acquiring matching weapon systems or exter-
nally by aligning with other powers, especially a great power. Balancing occurs
against powerful states as without an equilibrium, the strong can turn on the
weak anytime as intentions can change along with the increases in capabilities.
Balancing in the automatic variety, should occur naturally as otherwise, the
strong can dominate or challenge the security and sovereignty of the weaker
party (Waltz, 1979, pp. 126–128). States, in the classical world of balance of
power, ever mindful of survival, tend to seek power parity without which they
could be the victims of aggression. The strong would not start a war as it is
unlikely to win such a conflict without military preponderance.
This article argues that during the past seven decades of their existence as
modern states, India has infrequently engaged in forceful hard balancing, that is,
relying on military alliances and intense arms build-ups, but both countries have
made serious efforts not to resort to such behaviour against each other even when
the conditions were ripe for that. This has gradually changed since the arrival of
Xi Jinping, as India under Narendra Modi appears to have resorted to increased
military build-up, border military infrastructure development and the formation of
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