The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in West Bengal

AuthorPralay Kanungo
Published date01 June 2015
Date01 June 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/2321023015575213
Subject MatterIndia’s 2014 Elections
/tmp/tmp-17eHWG3BqKaex3/input India’s 2014 Elections
The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata
Studies in Indian Politics
3(1) 50–68
Party in West Bengal
© 2015 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2321023015575213
http://inp.sagepub.com
Pralay Kanungo1
Abstract
The impressive performance of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in West
Bengal is seen as a turning point in state politics—a saffron surge and the red retreat. While trying to
understand and explain the rise of the BJP, this article analyzes Hindutva politics in West Bengal in a
historical perspective, highlighting the ideological and organizational legacies of the Hindu Mahasabha,
the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the Sangh Parivar. Hindutva’s political ambition always remained frustrated
as the objective ideological and political milieu in a hostile Communist bastion had never been con-
genial to its brand of politics. Yet, the BJP continued to struggle for its existence, adopted pragmatic
political strategies at the local and regional level, entered into smart political alliance with the Trinamool
Congress at a crucial time, grabbed the opportunity to expand its base rapidly when the Left lost its
credibility and political control and, finally, when Mamata started messing up with her support base.
Buoyed by the BJP’s rise in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, Hindutva forces have unleashed an ambitious
and aggressive campaign to wrest West Bengal from Mamata’s Trinamool Congress in the 2016 assembly
elections; thus, West Bengal is likely to witness a fierce political battle in the coming days!
Keywords
Lok Sabha elections, West Bengal, Bharatiya Janata Party, Hindutva, partition, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Sangh
Parivar, communal polarization, minority appeasement, Matuas
Hindu nationalism and communism represent two antithetical ideologies. While the second Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief M.S. Golwalkar (Golwalkar, [1966] 1980) questioned the nationalist
credentials of the Communists and identified them as one of the enemies of Hindu Rashtra, Communists
always remained untiring and uncompromising critics of the ‘fascist’ Sangh Parivar (Yechuri, 1993). For
Hindu nationalism, West Bengal, the citadel of Indian Communists, which experienced an uninterrupted
rule of the Left Front for 34 years under the hegemony of the CPI(M), has always been an eye-sore; their
long-cherished dream to unfurl saffron flag in this red bastion remained a frustrating exercise. However,
the crushing defeat of the Left by Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress in the 2011 assembly elections,
and subsequent political upheavals in the post-Communist Bengal, offer an immense opportunity to
1 ICCR Chair of Contemporary India Studies, Leiden University, the Netherlands.
Corresponding author:
Pralay Kanungo, ICCR Chair of Contemporary India Studies, Leiden University, the Netherlands.
E-mail: pralaykanungo@yahoo.com

Kanungo 51
Hindu nationalists. In this context, the first section of this article deals with Hindutva’s Bengal connection,
the entry of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) into state politics, its inspiring electoral debut and subsequent
decline. The second section shows how the new avatar of the BJS, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
slowly entrenched in West Bengal by skilfully merging its national agenda with local politics, thus
carving out a distinct space for itself, though the record of its electoral performance has, by and large,
been unimpressive and unsteady. The third section, focusing on the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in
West Bengal, analyzes the complex interplay of issues, campaign, leadership and social forces which
contributed to the BJP’s surge in the state. The final section highlights how Hindutva forces, bolstered
by this surge, have launched an ambitious and aggressive political campaign not only to snatch away the
main opposition space from the Left but also to eventually overthrow the Mamata regime.
Hindutva’s Bengal Connection
Nineteenth-century Bengal produced the seed of Hindu nationalism, which germinated in Maharashtra
giving birth to the RSS in 1925. In fact, everyday discourse and practice in the RSS would remain
incomplete without invoking Bankim and Vivekananda. Bengal played an important role in the
making of K.B. Hedgewar, the founder of the RSS, and his successor M.S. Golwalkar. While
Hedgewar, as a medicine student in Calcutta, learnt lessons from Bengali radical nationalists, Golwalkar’s
sojourn at Ramakrishna Math tempered his Hindu nationalism with the idea of renunciation and
service (Kanungo, 2012). As Hindu Mahasabha was active in Bengal and was committed to protect
Hindu interest and counter the Muslim League, the RSS neither had any urgency nor resources to enter
Bengal.
Bengal was partitioned twice. While the first partition in 1905 was opposed by anti-colonial national-
ism, the second in 1947 was welcomed by communal forces at the expense of Indian nationalism and
Hindu–Muslim interrelations further deteriorated between the two partitions. Muslim League’s call for
‘Direct Action Day’ on 16 August 1946 was opposed by the Hindu Mahasabha, which mobilized Hindus
not to join the hartal as it would legitimize the creation of Pakistan. The August call triggered the Great
Calcutta Killings. Then came, as a sequel, the 1946 Noakhali–Tippera riots. The virus of communalism
was widespread in the countryside. Killings, forcible conversions and abductions of women compelled
Hindus to flee East Bengal in large numbers. By 1947, the Hindu Mahasabha was campaigning vocifer-
ously for partition of Bengal demanding the creation of a separate Hindu province within the Indian
Union.
Shyama Prasad Mookerjee joined Hindu Mahasabha in 1939 under the advice of Hedgewar and
Savarkar and became its president after Savarkar fell ill (Chatterji, 2010; Madhok, 2001). After the
Great Calcutta Killings, speaking on the no-confidence motion in the Bengal Legislative Assembly,
he blamed Chief Minister Surhawardy for the killing of Hindus and called him ‘the best goonda that
is available not only in the province but throughout the world’ (Mookerjee, 2002, p. 16). He was
inducted into the Nehru Cabinet as minister of industries and supplies in 1947. Mookerjee resigned from
the Hindu Mahasabha in December 1948 as his proposal for opening the party to members of all
communities was turned down. Subsequently, Mookerjee resigned also from the Nehru Cabinet
opposing Nehru–Liaquat Agreement, which stipulated that neither India nor Pakistan would make
‘extraterritorial claims’ on behalf of the Hindus of East Bengal, many of whom forced to flee due to
persecution by majority.
Mookerjee began his quest to form a political party to oppose Nehru’s policies. The RSS, during the
ban after Gandhi’s murder, was also seriously debating over having its own political front. As both these

52

Studies in Indian Politics 3(1)
Table 1. Performance of the BJS in Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections in West Bengal
Lok Sabha
Legislative Assembly
Seats
Seats
Percentage
Seats
Seats
Percentage of
Year
Contested
Won
of Votes Polled
Contested
Won
Votes Polled
1952
6
2
5.59
85
9
5.58
1957
5

1.43
32

0.98
1962
4

1.05
25

0.45
1967
7

1.39
58
1
1.33
1969



50

0.89
1971
4

0.85
23
1
0.82
1972



16

0.19
Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections to Lok Sabha and Statistical Report on General Elections to the Legislative
Assembly of West Bengal, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
missions converged, the BJS was launched in 1951 with Mookerjee as the president. An unprepared Jana
Sangh fought the first general election in 1951–1952 and secured over 3 per cent of votes in Lok Sabha
and 2.76 per cent in the state legislative elections. But Jana Sangh’s electoral performance in Mookerjee’s
home state was much better than its national show (see Table 1).
In the 1952 Lok Sabha elections, the BJS contested 6 out of 36 seats in West Bengal. The debut was
impressive as it won 2 seats and secured 5.59 per cent of vote share. S.P. Mookerjee won from Calcutta
south-east by securing 44.97 per cent of the votes, and Bandopadhyaya Durga Charan Das won from
Midnapore Jhargram, securing 26.61 per cent of votes. N.C. Chatterjee of the Hindu Mahasabha won the
Hoogly Lok Sabha seat, securing 36.19 per cent of votes.
In the Vidhan Sabha elections, the party contested 60 out of 238 seats and won 9 seats, securing 5.58
per cent of vote share; 8 were won in Midnapur and one in 24 Parganas. Some of the districts where the
party performed well were Midnapur (12.68 per cent), 24 Parganas (9.17 per cent), Nadia (7.76 per cent),
Hoogly (5.30 per cent), Burdwan (4.87 per cent) and Calcutta (3.47 per cent). This impressive
performance was primarily due to Mookherjee’s leadership and the support he got from Hindu refugees.
Hindu Mahasabha also won 4 out of the 33 assembly seats it contested and secured 2.37 per cent of
vote share. Thus, both BJS and HMS could muster around 8 per cent of votes with the support of a
Hindu vote bank.
The BJS and the Hindu Mahasabha joined hands to send Acharya Deva Prasad Ghosh to Rajya Sabha.
Ghosh, a friend of Mookerjee and a Hindu Mahasabha activist in the late 1930s, was a mathematics
professor in East Bengal who migrated in 1950 and joined the Jana Sangh. After Mookerjee’s death,
Ghosh became vice-president and later the...

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