Strategic Autonomy and India’s Hedging Policies in the Indo-Pacific
| Published date | 01 December 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241282095 |
| Author | C. Vinodan,Anju Lis Kurian |
| Date | 01 December 2024 |
Research Article
Strategic Autonomy and
India’s Hedging Policies
in the Indo-Pacific
C. Vinodan1 and Anju Lis Kurian2
Abstract
Hedging is a collection of tactics that includes bandwagoning, limited resistance
and involvement. Put another way, it is an insurance position between the two
simple tactics of balancing and bandwagoning. Many states, including India, have
adopted hedging as a favoured approach since the end of the Cold War. In light
of the US–China rivalry and shifting great power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific,
India continues to pursue a ‘hedging the bets’ strategy, despite the country and the
United States enjoying stronger strategic ties—particularly through the Quadri-
lateral Security Dialogue. This article argues that as a rising power with its own
ambitions to carve out a strategic space, India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific
seeks to retain a free, open and inclusive regional order. In the short and medium
terms, this means forming soft-balancing coalitions and limited hard-balancing re-
lationships with the United States. Strategic hedging still dominates Indian strate-
gy in a broad sense. Forming an alliance with Washington will alienate China and
Russia, the two great powers India is attempting not to dissociate completely.
India’s somewhat neutral position on the Russian war on Ukraine and reluctance
to join active military alliances in the Indo-Pacific indicates that hedging has value
for maintaining India’s strategic autonomy and aspirations for great power status
in the twenty-first century. India’s continued engagement through institutions
such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and G20 as well as increased
trade with China and Russia suggest the pursuit of a hedging strategy in its rela-
tions with other great powers.
Keywords
Indo-Pacific, strategic autonomy, hedging, ASEAN centrality, great powers
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
11(4) 475–495, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23477970241282095
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1 School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India
2 Department of Political Science, St Thomas College Palai Autonomous, Kottayam, Kerala, India
Corresponding author:
C. Vinodan, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam,
Kerala 686560, India.
E-mail: vinodan.c@gmail.com
476 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11(4)
Introduction
In the twenty-first century global order, the Indo-Pacific expanse has emerged as
a dynamic and strategically significant area, attracting the attention of major pow-
ers and shaping the geopolitical landscape. Countries all over the world are
actively modifying their strategic outlooks and developing new policies to
increase their influence in the Indo-Pacific area as it emerges as the global centre
of strategic and economic gravity, while nations in the region attempt to handle
this increased attention (Haruko, 2020; Paskal, 2021; Radjaradjane, 2022). The
Indo-Pacific’s inherent characteristics, such as its interconnectedness, breadth and
multi-polarity as a multi-player game, contribute to the region’s solution to the
strategic challenge of navigating China’s grand power play and the more aggres-
sive and unilateral features of US reassertion. At least four major powers—China,
India, Japan and the United States—as well as numerous important middle
players—Australia, South Korea, the nations of Southeast Asia and Europe,
among others—have interests that intersect in the Indo-Pacific power narrative.
Russia is also becoming more noticeable. Thus, the Indo-Pacific area is a multi-
polar system, where the interests and agencies of numerous states determine the
fate of regional order or disorder rather than that of one or even two powers, the
United States and China (Medcalf, 2019; Suzuki, 2020).
The Indo-Pacific region is essential to American security and economic growth,
as the country has long acknowledged. China is trying to become the most powerful
country in the world by combining its economic, diplomatic, military and techno-
logical strength in order to expand its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Chinese aggression and coercion are widespread, but they are particularly severe in
the Indo-Pacific region (The White House, 2022). The major world powers, includ-
ing the US, Australia, Japan, India and the United States are now uniting through the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and cooperative military exercises like the
Malabar exercise, while China continues to play its cards. In order to guarantee a
free and open Indo-Pacific area, some European nations, including France, Germany
and others, are collaborating with the US and India and have developed their own
perspectives on the prevailing geopolitical framework (Singh, 2023).
India’s geopolitical location enables it to be a major player in the Indo-Pacific,
providing both opportunities and challenges. As a result, India has recognised the
significance of developing a comprehensive and nuanced approach to navigate
the complexities of the region. As a rising power with diverse geopolitical inter-
ests and security concerns, India seeks to safeguard its national interests while
maintaining a delicate balance in the evolving regional dynamics. The geostrate-
gic location, capability plus ambitions and the various threat perceptions remain
as the key determinants in shaping India’s position in the Indo-Pacific region. Its
population and expanding economic aspirations spurred a desire to participate
more actively in the geopolitics and security architecture of the area (Bhatt, 2018;
Ganapathi, 2019; Haruko, 2020; Tourangbam, 2021). India’s goal has been clear:
to use the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical space to advance its interests by maintain-
ing strategic autonomy and respond to changing security environment through
hedging policies (Baruah, 2020).
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