Russia’s Foreign Policy
| Author | Rajan Kumar |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020881717745961 |
| Date | 01 July 2016 |
| Published date | 01 July 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Russia’s Foreign Policy:
An Overview of 25 Years
of Transition
Rajan Kumar1
Abstract
This article provides a broad overview of Russian foreign policy in the last three
decades. It has divided this period into three broad categories—neoliberal-
ism and the West-centric policy (1991–1995); Eurasianism and the search for
multipolarity (1996–2006); and crossing the Rubicon (2007–2015)—marked by
external interventions. Taking domestic factors into account, it analyses how
Russian foreign policy took a radical turn from being a West-centric to a
complete break with the West. Russian interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and
Syria have revived the spectre of the beginning of a new Cold War. Towards the
end, it discusses how Russia has developed a close economic and strategic
partnership with China, especially after the sanctions from the West.
Keywords
Foreign policy, Russia, Yeltsin, Putin, Kozyrev, neoliberalism, eurasianism, crossing
the Rubicon, NATO, BRICS, Crimea, Syria, EU
Russia’s foreign policy underwent three distinct phases of transition in the last
25 years. In the first phase (1991–1995), the main thrust was to substitute the
decaying socialist institutions with a capitalist and liberal democratic form of
governance. This was the phase of rapid economic privatization initiated by shock
therapy and loans-for-shares schemes and political reforms characterized by a
new constitution and the emerging super-presidential system. The kamikaze crew
consisted of Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar, Andrei Kozyrev and Anatoly Chubais
(Desai, 2006). The success of the transition was contingent upon the financial,
technological and ideological support from the capitalist countries of the West.
Article
International Studies
53(3–4) 210–226
2018 Jawaharlal Nehru University
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020881717745961
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/isq
1 Associate Professor, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India.
Corresponding author:
Rajan Kumar, Associate Professor, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India.
E-mail: rajan75jnu@gmail.com
Kumar 211
In this phase, Russia tried to appease the West and be recognized as a ‘normal’
member of Europe. The second phase (1996–2006) witnessed a gradual shift in its
policy from a West-centric approach to a more pragmatic and balanced foreign
policy. This departure was institutionalized by Yevgeny Primakov who replaced
Kozyrev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He advocated multipolarity as an
alternative to American hegemony and gave priority to Russian interests in CIS
and in Asia. He tried to balance the West by forging partnerships in the East and
the near abroad. Finally, the third phase of protestation and intervention (2007–
2017) began with Putin’s speech at Munich in 2007 (Shanker & Landler, 2007).
This marked a radical departure from the earlier policy of being cautious and
guarded towards the West. Russia dropped the pretence of being diplomatic and
civil, and categorically blamed the US and NATO for provoking an arms race,
creating instability in West Asia and bypassing international institutions. This was
followed by three major interventions in the neighbourhood and beyond. The West
was clueless and surprised by each intervention. It had no strategy except eco-
nomic sanctions to tame Russia. The amount of risk increased with each sub-
sequent intervention. Russia was willing to take risks, while the West was reluctant
to commit military on the ground. Russia re-emerged as an indispensible and
indomitable actor in the international system. Some scholars declared it as the
beginning of a new Cold War (Cohen, 2017; Lucas, 2014).
Historical Context
History may not be the perfect guide for making inferences about the contempo-
rary policies of Russia but a broader pattern does throw some light on the general
behaviour of the State. Historians have empirically shown that some aspects of
Russia’s foreign policy are rooted in the past. Following elements are indispensi-
ble to understanding the foreign policy of Russia.
‘Orthodoxy’, ‘autocracy’ and ‘nationalism’ were the main constituents of ide-
ology during the Tsarist times (Kissinger, 1994). Russia was never a part of
the so-called ‘progressive’ West. Even during the nineteenth century, Russia took
the side of conservative Germany and Austria rather than progressive France
(Tsygankov, 2010). Peter the Great was hugely influenced by scientific achieve-
ments and technological advances of the West, but he rejected the notion of popular
sovereignty. Russia remained the backwater of political reforms in Europe.
Russia gives priority to state over people and centralization over diffusion of
power. Tsarist rulers were autocratic. They rejected the idea of sharing power with
people in parliament. A number of political reforms related to power-sharing were
introduced in 1905, but they were too little and too late. Tsars promoted the cause
of state patriotism over popular nationalism (Tsygankov, 2010). The present
regime is also opposed to the idea of sharing power.
Religion renders a unique identity to Russia, but it also isolates Russia from the
neighbouring countries in the West which are predominantly catholic or protes-
tant. The sense of Russian exceptionalism is based on its religious and linguistic
exclusivity. But the state in Russia has a secular character. Orthodox Christianity
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