Role Conception of the Asia-Pacific Middle Powers: Comparative Analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam

AuthorMoch Faisal Karim,Rona Nabila
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/23477970221098469
Published date01 August 2022
Date01 August 2022
Subject MatterResearch Articles
Research Article
Role Conception of the
Asia-Pacific Middle
Powers: Comparative
Analysis of Indonesia,
South Korea, Australia
and Vietnam
Moch Faisal Karim1 and Rona Nabila2
Abstract
This article examines the variety of roles enacted by Asia-Pacific middle powers
in response to the rise of China. This article identifies two factors determining
such variety, especially in the security realm: alignment pattern and geopolitical
constraints. We argue that the differences in level of alignment with the United
States and the risk of geopolitical tension with China affect the role conception
taken by the middle powers. We assert that the combination of a high-level of
alignment and high geopolitical risk tends to cause them to take a bridging role,
a low-level of alignment and low geopolitical risk drive them to take the role of
regional leader, a high-level of alignment and low geopolitical risk allow them to
become faithful allies, and a low-level of alignment and high geopolitical risk enable
them to take an active independent role. We illustrate this framework through
the comparative analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam.
Keywords
Role conception, middle power, alignment politics, Asia-Pacific, the rise of China
Introduction
Since implementing significant economic reforms in 1978, China has risen to a
position of a global power. As part of its new-found role, China has become more
assertive in demonstrating its power and now represents a strategic challenge to
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
9(2) 231–254, 2022
© The Author(s) 2022
Reprints and permissions:
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DOI: 10.1177/23477970221098469
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1 Department of International Relations, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia
2
Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS), Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia
Corresponding author:
Moch Faisal Karim, Department of International Relations, Bina Nusantara University, Jalan
Kemanggisan Ilir III, No. 45, Palmerah, Jakarta 11480, Indonesia.
E-mail: faisal.karim@binus.ac.id
232 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 9(2)
the United States (US) and its Western allies (Kim, 2015b). At the time when
major economic powers, such as the US, Europe, and Japan began to experience
a decline due to the 2008 financial crisis, China instead succeeded in boosting its
economy and positioning itself as the new world economic power (Hadi, 2012).
However, there continues an ongoing debate about how other states are
responding to the rise of China, especially in Asia (Gloria, 2021). Some scholars
argue that Asia-Pacific states tend to bandwagon with China (Kang, 2003), while
others argue that those states try to balance China’s impact by siding with the US
(Acharya, 2003). Most scholars, though, agree that Asia-Pacific states generally
prefer to mobilise a hedging strategy instead of choosing between balancing and
band wagoning (Cheng-Chwee, 2008; Goh, 2008, 2011; Karim & Chairil, 2016).
A hedging strategy is defined as a sort of behaviour that assists states in dealing
with the specific types of uncertainty that are expected in anticipating rising
powers (Tessman & Wolfe, 2011). In short, hedging is an alternative concept that
seems to effectively explain the opportunistic behaviour of a group of states,
where they undertake a counteracting policy—preparing for military conflict
while bolstering economic cooperation and diplomatic relationship at the same
time—in order to avoid a confrontation with great powers (Koga, 2018).
This article aims to shift the debate regarding Asia-Pacific states’ response
towards a rising China by framing the issues through the notions of middle powers
and role conception. Due to their capabilities, behaviours and self-identification,
many states in the Asia-Pacific region are categorised as middle powers, such as
South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia (Beeson & Lee, 2015; Emmers &
Teo, 2015; Karim, 2018; Kim, 2015b). In general, the concept of middle power is
used for countries whose power, resources, and abilities are not as large as those
of superpowers but are nevertheless sufficient to support said countries to stand
on their own (Jordaan, 2003). Given their lack of power and resources, middle
powers often take on distinctive roles in order to leverage their ‘middle-
powerhood’ in international politics. As a result, their enactment of key roles in
responding to China’s rise also varies.
This article then examines the relations between the role conception enacted by
middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region and how they have responded to the rise
of China. The framework used in this article retrieves data from 2003 to 2017.
Although there has been substantial research analysing the response of Asia-
Pacific countries to the rise of China, there are few studies that analyse the link
between middle powers’ role conception and their strategic responses towards
China. To illustrate this discussion, this article focuses on South Korea, Indonesia,
Australia and Vietnam as examples of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific. The four
countries are interesting to compare: all face a major economic opportunity but
also a strategic challenge. In addition to the fact that they are considered as middle
powers, they also have complex relations with China and the US.
South Korea, Indonesia, Australia and Vietnam, all have established economic
relations with China that have developed steadily from year to year. For instance,
South Korea’s merchandise exports to China rose from US$1.3 billion to US$136
billion between 1989 and 2019, while China’s merchandise export to South Korea
grew from US$472 million to US$108 billion over the same period (Observatory of

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