Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 57/2017, 1257/2016, 153/2017, 160/2017, 178/2017, 199/2017, 8/2017, 9/2017, 185/2017, 228/2017, 10/2017, 244/2017, 290/2017 and 324/2017. Case: Revanna and Ors. Vs The State of Karnataka and Ors.. High Court of Karnataka (India)

Case NumberCriminal Revision Petition Nos. 57/2017, 1257/2016, 153/2017, 160/2017, 178/2017, 199/2017, 8/2017, 9/2017, 185/2017, 228/2017, 10/2017, 244/2017, 290/2017 and 324/2017
CounselFor Appellant: Ravindra B. Deshpande, Adv. and For Respondents: M. Munigangappa, HCGP
JudgesP.S. Dinesh Kumar, J.
IssueArms Act, 1959 - Sections 25, 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 397, 397(2), 401, 482; Explosive Substances Act, 1908 - Sections 5, 6; Indian Penal Code 1860, (IPC) - Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 123, 149, 153A, 212, 306, 376, 409, 417, 420, 467, 468, 471; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Sections 10, 13(2), 13(1)(d), 13(1)...
Judgement DateMarch 24, 2017
CourtHigh Court of Karnataka (India)

Order:

P.S. Dinesh Kumar, J.

1. A common question of law whether a revision petition is maintainable against an order rejecting a prayer to discharge and framing of charges by the Trial Court in view of bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is involved in all these petitions.

2. Heard Shri B.V. Acharya, Shri P.S. Rajagopal and Shri. M.T. Nanaiah, learned Senior Counsel & other learned counsel for petitioner/s in respective petitions and Shri Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned Counsel for Lokayukta and Shri. Munigangappa, learned HCGP for the State.

3. These petitions may be categorized into two batches. One, in which the petitioners are alleged of commission of offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('P.C. Act' for short) as also Indian Penal Code ('IPC for short) and another in which they are alleged of commission of offences other than P.C. Act. The specific offences alleged against the petitioners in respective petitions are as under:

Sl. No.

Case No.

Filed Under Section

Offences

1

Crl. RP. No. 57/2017 (Crime No. 236/2014

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

306 IPC

2

Crl. R.P. No. 1257/2016 (Crime No. 15/2009)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 7 r/w. 13(2) of P.C. Act

3

Crl. R.P. No. 153/2017(FIR No. RC01(A)/2014-BLR)

397 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120-B r/w. 409, 420, 467, 468 & 471 IPC Sec. 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act

4

Crl. R.P. No. 160/2017 (Crime No. 117/2015)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

376, 417 IPC

5

Crl. R.P. No. 178/2017 (Crime No. 1/2012)

397 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 7 r/w. 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of P.C. Act

6

Crl. R.P. No. 199/2017 (Crime No. 242/2014)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120B, 121A, 122, 123, 153-A, 212 r/w 149 of IPC and Sec. 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act, Sec. 9(b) r/w sec.5 and 6 of the Indian Explosive substance Act and Sec. 3 and 25 of the Arms Act

7

Crl. R.P. No. 8/2017 (Spl. C.C No. 14/2014)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120-B r/w. 409 & 420 IPC and Sections 7, 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(c) & (d) of P.C. Act

8

Crl. R.P. No. 9/2017 (Spl. C.C No. 36/2014)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120-B r/w. 409 & 420 IPC and PC ACT

9

Crl. R.P. No. 185/2017 (Spl. C.C. No. 38/2014)

397 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 7, 13(2), 13(1) (c) & (d) of P.C. Act and Sec. 120-B r/w. 409 & 420 IPC

10

Crl. R.P. No. 228/2017 (FIR No. RC01(A)/2014-BLR)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120-B r/w. 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC & Sec. 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act

11

Crl. R.P. No. 10/2017 (Spl. C.C. No. 37/2014)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 120-B, 409, 420 of IPC & Sections 7, 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(c) & (d) of P.C. Act

12

Crl. R.P. No. 244/2017 (Spl. C.C. No. 101/2013)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 7, 8, 10, 13(1) ((d) R/w. Sec. 13(2) of P.C. Act

13

Crl. R.P. No. 290/2017 (S.C. No. 100/2016) (Crime No. 10/2010 in FIR)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

306 IPC

14

Crl. R.P. No. 324/2017 (Spl. C.C. No. 77/2007)

397 & 401 Cr.P.C.

Sec. 13(1)(e) r/w 13 (2) of P.C. Act

4. The finite consideration in all these petitions is their maintainability. Therefore, detailed narration of facts may not be necessary. However, conspectuses of necessary facts are petitioners accused of certain offences sought for discharge before the Trial Courts. Their prayers have been rejected and the respective Trial Courts have proceeded further to frame charges. Feeling aggrieved, they have filed these revision petitions.

5. Registry has raised an objection with regard to maintainability of these petitions in view of bar contained in Sec. 397(2) Cr.P.C.

6. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners may be summarized as follows:

i) that an order passed by the trial court declining to discharge an accused is not an interlocutory order;

ii) that the objection raised by the registry with regard to maintainability of a revision petition is no more res integra. It has been settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that an order directing framing of charge is not an interlocutory order and therefore, the revision petitions are maintainable. Hence, applying the doctrine of 'stare decisis,' it may be held that a revision petition is maintainable;

iii) that the judgment in the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. [1980 Supp Supreme Court Cases 92: AIR 1980 SC 962] is not applicable to the facts of these cases because, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering maintainability of an appeal under Sec. 11 (2) of the Special Court's Act, 1979 which was enacted for a special purpose for speedy disposal of cases and the Special Court was headed by a sitting judge of the High Court;

iv) that the judgment in the case of V.C. Shukla is rendered keeping in view the purpose and intent of a Special Act and to ensure that flooding of cases is avoided to the Supreme Court;

v) though Sub Section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. places an embargo from entertaining a revision petition, all orders cannot be classified only under two categories namely, 'interlocutory' and 'final'. There is a third kind of order namely, 'intermediate order' as defined in V.C. Shukla's case;

vi) that the judgments in the cases of Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and another [(1977) 4 SCC 137] and Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551] cover the point involved in these petitions. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.C. Shukla that those cases were correctly decided;

vii) that in the case of K.K. Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and another [(2000) 6 SCC 195], the Hon'ble Supreme Court after applying a 'feasible test' has held that an order rejecting a prayer to discharge is revisable. The test applied was whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, and if so, an order passed on such objections would not be interlocutory in nature;

7. In support of their...

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