Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 26 of 2017. Case: Rajeev Khanna and Ors. Vs State of Uttarakhand. Uttarakhand High Court
|Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 26 of 2017
|For Appellant: U.K. Uniyal, Sr. Advocate assisted by Sandeep Kothari, Advocate and For Respondents: K.S. Rautela, Government Advocate assisted by D.K. Sharma, Addl. Advocate General and Raman Kumar Shah, Dy. Advocate General
|Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J.
|Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 389(3); Constitution of India - Article 21
|January 11, 2017
|Uttarakhand High Court
Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J.
By means of present criminal writ petition, the petitioners seek a writ, order or direction that the notice period provided in Chapter XVIII, Rule 18 of Rules of Court, 1952, as applicable in the Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand, be reduced and the bail application of the petitioners, which was noticed in the office of the Government Advocate on 07.01.2017 be heard earlier.
I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Advocate, learned Addl. Advocate General & learned Dy. Advocate General for the State and gave anxious consideration to the submissions made by them.
The short question which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the High Court can entertain a bail application prior to the expiry of ten days time, or not?
A decision rendered by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Gyan Swaroop Gupta v. State of U.P., reported in 1993 CRI. L. J. 3895, has been placed before this Court. Paragraphs No. 11 and 14 of the said decision read as below:
"11. The first decision cited by Sri V.C. Tewari is 1984 U.P. Criminal Rulings 159 (1984 Cri LJ 1156) (Ramesh Chandra Kapil v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad) where the Division Bench held that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and dispose of the bail application is not inhibited either by Language of Rule 18(2)(3) of Chapter XVIII of the High Court Rules. The inherent power which vests in a Court of record such as the High Court to regulate its own procedure for dealing with the matters of which it is seized. The Division Bench relied on observations of another Division Bench reported in 1970 All LJ 328 (Paras Nath Tiwari v. Bhaiya Lal) and quoted as under:
The rules only regulate the sittings of the Court. They are not the source from which the Judges of this Court derive jurisdiction to decide cases.
They are framed for convenience and proper working of the Court and do not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the Bench receiving a case to pass such orders as it considers just and proper.
Thus, the High Court being a Court of record is invested with inherent jurisdiction to dispose of the cases coming before it and prescribe an appropriate procedure for that purpose. To quote again from Paras Nath Tiwari's case (supra):
"Once the case is before a Bench, it has full jurisdiction to decide it and is not fully seized of it but has complete dominion over it to fix dates and decide it in accordance with its view and the law on the subject.
We are of the opinion that the regulation of the sittings of the Judges of the Court is not a judicial function that the Chief Justice performs. It is only an administrative power discharged to facilitate the performance of the judicial functions of the Court by the various Judges who constitute it.
In fact, this is the substance of the well known legal practice CURSUS CURLAF LEX CURAE. Every Court is the guardian of its own records and matter (master) of its own practice."
Thus, from the consideration of the above case law it is clear that the provision of Chapter XVIII, Rule 18(2)(3) of the High Court Rules do not curb or curtail the powers of the High Court for entertaining a bail application prior to expiry of ten days time. The Court has inherent power...
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