Civil Appeal No. 8434 of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22487 of 2012). Case: Raghubir Singh Vs General Manager, Haryana Roadways. Supreme Court (India)
| Case Number | Civil Appeal No. 8434 of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22487 of 2012) |
| Judges | Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya and V. Gopala Gowda, JJ. |
| Issue | Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 2, 10(1), 11A; Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 137; Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946; Preventive Detention Act, 1950; Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Section 409; Constitution of India - Articles 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 136, 311(2); Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 - Rule 7 |
| Judgement Date | September 03, 2014 |
| Court | Supreme Court (India) |
Judgment:
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the order dated 09.01.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P.A. No. 20 of 2012, whereby the High Court dismissed the L.P.A. and affirmed the order dated 14.11.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the C.W.P. No. 20996 of 2011, urging various grounds.
3. The necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to appreciate the case of the Appellant and to ascertain whether the Appellant is entitled for the relief as prayed in this appeal.
In 1976, the Appellant joined the Haryana Roadways as a conductor. On 10.08.1993, the Appellant was charged Under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code in a criminal case at the instance of the Respondent for alleged misappropriation of the amount collected from tickets and not depositing the cash in relation to the same in time. The Appellant was arrested by the Jurisdictional police and sent to judicial custody on 15.09.1994. Further, on 21.10.1994 the services of the Appellant were terminated by the General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, the Respondent herein. On 15.11.1994, the Appellant upon being released on bail was given an oral assurance by the Respondent that he will be reinstated to the post after his acquittal by the Court.
4. On 11.07.2002, upon being acquitted by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar, in Crl. Case No. 33-I of 1994, the Appellant reported to join his duty, but he was informed by the Respondent that his services stood terminated w.e.f. 21.10.1994. The Appellant served the demand notice upon the Respondent which was not acceded to and therefore, the industrial dispute with regard to order of termination from his services was raised before the conciliation officer. On failure of the conciliation proceedings before him, the industrial dispute was referred by the State Government in exercise of its statutory power Under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act') to the Labour Court, Hissar for adjudication of the existing industrial dispute in relation to the order of dismissal of the Appellant from his services. After adjudication of the points of dispute referred to it, the Labour Court vide its award dated 22.05.2009 declared that the termination of the Appellant from his services was illegal and passed an award of reinstatement of the Appellant with 60% back wages from the date of issuance of demand notice till publication of the award and full back wages thereafter, till reinstatement.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the Respondent-Haryana Roadways filed C.W.P. No. 13366 of 2009 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Court vide its order dated 01.04.2010 set aside the award dated 22.05.2009 and remanded the case back to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication in the light of the applicability of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, to the Appellant/workman.
6. The Labour Court vide its award dated 17.05.2011 in R.M. No. 3 of 2010 answered the reference by passing an award against the Appellant on the ground that the reference of the industrial dispute is time barred. The Appellant challenged the correctness of the said award by filing a Civil Writ Petition No. 20996 of 2011 before the High Court, which was dismissed on 14.11.2011 by the learned single Judge of the High Court holding that the decision of the disciplinary authority of the Respondent is in the public interest and therefore, the same does not warrant interference.
7. The Appellant thereafter filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 20 of 2012 before the Division Bench of the High Court against the order of the learned single Judge. The same was dismissed vide order dated 09.01.2012 on the ground that the services of the Appellant were terminated by the Respondent on 21.10.1994 in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, whereas the Appellant had raised the industrial dispute vide the demand notice in the year, 2002. The Division Bench of the High Court found no illegality or irregularity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 09.01.2012 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the Appellant has filed this appeal urging various grounds.
9. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the services of the Appellant was illegally terminated from his services on the ground of alleged misconduct of unauthorised absence, and no enquiry was conducted before the termination of services of the Appellant. Further, it is contended that the reasons accorded by the Respondent are not justified for dispensing with the inquiry procedure in relation to the allegations against the Appellant and invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and the Respondent had terminated the services of the Appellant without complying with the principles of natural justice.
10. The learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana, Mr. Narender Hooda has vehemently contended that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the reference of the industrial dispute being on the ground that it was barred by limitation by answering the additional issue No. 2 by placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota v. Mohan Lal (2013) 14 SCC 543 wherein this Court has held as under:
19. We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and Anr. v. Gitam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136 that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.
11. In our view of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, the reference was made by the State Government to the Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial dispute; it has erroneously held it to be barred by limitation. This award was further erroneously affirmed by the High Court, which is bad in law and therefore the same is liable to be set aside. According to Section 10(1) of the Act, the appropriate government 'at any time' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it is of the opinion that such an industrial dispute between the workman & the employer exists or is apprehended. Section 10(1) reads as follows:
10(1)[Where the appropriate government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time], by order in writing-
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication.
Thus, it is necessary for us to carefully observe the phrase 'at any time' used in this section. Therefore, there arises an issue whether the question of limitation is applicable to the reference of the existing industrial dispute that would be made by the State Government either to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal for adjudication at the instance of the Appellant. This Court in Avon Services Production Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Ors. (1979) 1 SCC 1, after interpreting the phrases 'at any time' rendered in Section 10(1) of the Act, held thus:
7...Section 10(1) enables the appropriate Government to make reference of an industrial dispute which exists or is apprehended at any time to one of the authorities mentioned in the section. How and in what manner or through what machinery the Government is apprised of the dispute is hardly relevant.......The only requirement for taking action Under Section 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government which will enable the appropriate Government to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an administrative function of the Government as the expression is understood in contradistinction to judicial or quasi-judicial function....
Therefore, it is implicit from the above case that in case of delay in raising the industrial dispute, the appropriate government Under Section 10(1) of the Act has the power, to make reference to either Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, if it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended at any time, between the workman and the employer. Further, in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 222, it is held by this Court as under:
15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though...
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