Navigating US–China Rivalry in a Multi-aligned Middle East: Understanding India’s Shifting Strategy Towards the Region
| Published date | 01 December 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241285200 |
| Author | Nicolas Blarel |
| Date | 01 December 2024 |
Research Article
Navigating US–China
Rivalry in a Multi-
aligned Middle East:
Understanding India’s
Shifting Strategy
Towards the Region
Nicolas Blarel1
Abstract
Indian economic and strategic involvement in the Middle East has seen a trans-
formation over the past two decades. This development has happened as many
observers remark a gradual decline of US influence juxtaposed with China’s grow-
ing presence in the region. This article aims to assess how India has managed its
bilateral relations with China within this region of increasing economic and stra-
tegic interest. Despite a growing literature on the China-India rivalry in Southeast
Asia, South Asia or Central Asia, there is a notable dearth of scholarship on the
China–India rivalry and its implications in the Middle East. Filling this gap, this arti-
cle focuses on explaining how India has adapted its policies towards China’s rising
influence in Middle Eastern politics. The core argument is that India’s strategy has
been shaped by both a perception of declining US’ engagement in the Middle East
and by opportunities created by new strategic hedging strategies from key regional
players such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. The article determines that
India moved over the last decade from a strategy of buck-passing on US’ securi-
ty provision to one of partial soft balancing of China’s strategic presence in the
Middle East. However, the article also notes the limitations of standard theories
of balance-of-power and strategic hedging to account for India’s multifaceted
approach towards a regional order in flux.
Keywords
USA, China, rivalry, Middle East
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
11(4) 536–556, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23477970241285200
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1 Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Nicolas Blarel, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Turfmarkt 99, 2511 DP The Hague,
Netherlands.
E-mail: n.r.j.b.blarel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Blarel 537
Introduction
Since the nineteenth century, European powers, the United States and Russia,
were dominant extra-regional powers in the Middle East (Barr, 2018; Takeyh &
Simon, 2016). These powers had a vital interest in accessing and controlling stra-
tegic goods, such as crude oil and gas, as well as maintaining freedom of naviga-
tion in the region. Over the last two decades, however, China and India have
become increasingly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. China has increased its
trade with the Middle East and, in 2020, replaced the European Union as the Gulf
Cooperation Council’s (GCC) largest trading partner (Aluwaisheg, 2021).
Additionally, China is now Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE’s)
largest non-oil trading partner globally, and the UAE is China’s second-largest
trading partner (Abdulkader & Hassan, 2022; Alhamawi, 2022). Similarly, India’s
bilateral trade with the GCC was estimated at $154 billion in 2021–2022, account-
ing for 10.4% of its total exports and 18% of imports (PTI, 2023).
Accordingly, the two rising Asian powers have recognised the critical role of
the Middle East for their future economic growth and development and have inte-
grated the region into their strategic planning. The region has been key for India
and China’s energy security, and, to some degree, for their own domestic political
stability. This development has happened as many regional actors have remarked
a gradual decline of US interest and involvement in the Middle East (Alterman,
2024; Colley, 2023; Kavanagh & Wehrey, 2023; MacDonald & Parent, 2024).
Furthermore, India and China’s growing involvement in the Middle East has been
happening as both powers are still locked into a long-time spatial and positional
rivalry in Asia (Ganguly et al., 2023; Garver, 2001; Paul, 2018). One could also
ask whether deteriorating India–China relations since the border standoff of 2020
also further complicated their interactions in the Middle East.
Until recently, these geopolitical developments had received scant attention from
policymakers and scholars. Although there is an expanding scholarship on China’s
relations with the Middle East (Chaziza, 2020; Dorsey, 2019; Ehteshami & Horesh,
2018; Ehteshami & Miyagi, 2015; Fulton, 2022; Horesh, 2016; Reardon-Anderson,
2018; Scobell & Nader, 2016; Zoubir, 2023), there have been fewer studies on
India’s Middle East policies (Abhyankar, 2008; Blarel, 2022; Mudiam, 1994; Pant
& Alhasan, 2023; Quamar, 2023; Singh, 2024; Ward, 1992) and even fewer works
on the implications of India–China rivalry in this region (Fulton, 2022; Huwaidin,
2022; Janardhan, 2022; Kemp, 2010). This stands in contrast to the significant
literature analysing relations between India and China in other Asian sub-
regions (Grare, 2017; Grare & Smaan, 2022; Kavalski, 2019; Mohan, 2022).
This article seeks therefore to examine the different foreign policy choices
adopted by India in the context of US–China strategic competition against the
background of the regional order transition in the Middle East. With India and
China’s economies increasingly reliant on resources and trade prospects in the
Middle East, potential areas of conflict have emerged. Furthermore, the India–
China rivalry has evolved from territorial disputes to an intensifying positional
rivalry that has extended beyond their immediate borders, and potentially now to
the Middle East (Blarel, 2020). As a result, this article also aims to critically assess
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