Writ Petition (Civil) No. 210 of 2012. Case: Namit Sharma Vs Union of India (UOI). Supreme Court (India)

Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 210 of 2012
CounselFor Appellant: Amit Sharma and Rahul Jain, Advs. and For Respondents: A.S. Chandiok, ASG, R.K. Rathore, Rekha Pandey and B.V. Balram Das, Advs.
JudgesA.K. Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.
IssueRight to Information Act, 2005 - Sections 2, 3, 4, 4(1), 4(2), 5, 6, 7, 8, 8(1), 9, 10, 11, 12, 12(3), 12(5), 12(6), 15, 15(5), 15(6), 18, 18(1), 18(3), 19, 19(1), 19(3), 19(6), 19(7), 20, 20(1), 20(2), 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28; Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 74, 75, 76, 77, 78; Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 - Section 25(6)...
Citation2013 (1) ABR 10, 2013 (1) AKR 57, 2013 (1) AWC 701 SC, 2012 (6) BomCR 380, JT 2012 (9) SC 166, JT 2012 (9) SC 209, 2013 (2) LW 1, 2012 (4) RCR 903 (Civil), 2012 (8) SCALE 593, 2013 (1) SCC 745, 2013 (1) SCC (LS) 244
Judgement DateSeptember 13, 2012
CourtSupreme Court (India)

Judgment:

Swatanter Kumar, J.

  1. The value of any freedom is determined by the extent to which the citizens are able to enjoy such freedom. Ours is a constitutional democracy and it is axiomatic that citizens have the right to know about the affairs of the Government which, having been elected by them, seeks to formulate some policies of governance aimed at their welfare. However, like any other freedom, this freedom also has limitations. It is a settled proposition that the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (for short 'the Constitution') encompasses the right to impart and receive information. The Right to Information has been stated to be one of the important facets of proper governance. With the passage of time, this concept has not only developed in the field of law, but also has attained new dimensions in its application. This Court while highlighting the need for the society and its entitlement to know has observed that public interest is better served by effective application of the right to information. This freedom has been accepted in one form or the other in various parts of the world. This Court, in absence of any statutory law, in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India and Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal and Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 161 held as under:

    The democracy cannot exist unless all citizens have a right to participate in the affairs of the polity of the country. The right to participate in the affairs of the country is meaningless unless the citizens are well informed on all sides of the issues, in respect of which they are called upon to express their views. One-sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information, all equally create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce when medium of information is monopolized either by a partisan central authority or by private individuals or oligarchy organizations. This is particularly so in a country like ours where about 65 per cent of the population is illiterate and hardly 1 1/2 per cent of the population has an access to the print media which is not subject to pre-censorship.

  2. The legal principle of 'A man's house is his castle. The midnight knock by the police bully breaking into the peace of the citizen's home is outrageous in law', stated by Edward Coke has been explained by Justice Douglas as follows:

    The free State offers what a police state denies - the privacy of the home, the dignity and peace of mind of the individual. That precious right to be left alone is violated once the police enter our conversations.

  3. The States which are governed by Policing and have a policy of greater restriction and control obviously restrict the enjoyment of such freedoms. That, however, does not necessarily imply that this freedom is restriction-free in the States where democratic governance prevails. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution itself is controlled by the reasonable restrictions imposed by the State by enacting various laws from time to time.

  4. The Petitioner, a public spirited citizen, has approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution stating that though the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short 'Act of 2005') is an important tool in the hands of any citizen to keep checks and balances on the working of the public servants, yet the criterion for appointment of the persons who are to adjudicate the disputes under this Act are too vague, general, ultra vires the Constitution and contrary to the established principles of law laid down by a plethora of judgments of this Court. It is the stand of the Petitioner that the persons who are appointed to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial functions or powers under the Act of 2005 ought to have a judicial approach, experience, knowledge and expertise. Limitation has to be read into the competence of the legislature to prescribe the eligibility for appointment of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies like the Chief Information Commissioner, Information Commissioners and the corresponding posts in the States, respectively. The legislative power should be exercised in a manner which is in consonance with the constitutional principles and guarantees. Complete lack of judicial expertise in the Commission may render the decision making process impracticable, inflexible and in given cases, contrary to law. The availability of expertise of judicial members in the Commission would facilitate the decision-making to be more practical, effective and meaningful, besides giving semblance of justice being done. The provision of eligibility criteria which does not even lay down any qualifications for appointment to the respective posts under the Act of 2005 would be unconstitutional, in terms of the judgments of this Court in the cases of Union of India v. Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1; Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 14 SCC 107; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261; R.K Jain v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119; S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 124.

  5. It is contended that keeping in view the powers, functions and jurisdiction that the Chief/State Information Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioners exercise undisputedly, including the penal jurisdiction, there is a certain requirement of legal acumen and expertise for attaining the ends of justice, particularly, under the provisions of the Act of 2005. On this premise, the Petitioner has questioned the constitutional validity of Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 12 and Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 15 of the Act of 2005. These provisions primarily deal with the eligibility criteria for appointment to the posts of Chief Information Commissioners and Information Commissioners, both at the Central and the State levels. It will be useful to refer to these provisions at this very stage.

    Section 12 -- (5) The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance.

    (6) The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession.

    XXX

    Section 15(5) The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance

    (6) The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession.

  6. The challenge to the constitutionality of the above provisions inter alia is on the following grounds:

    (i) Enactment of the provisions of eligibility criteria for appointment to such high offices, without providing qualifications, definite criterion or even consultation with judiciary, are in complete violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14, 16 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

    (ii) Absence of any specific qualification and merely providing for experience in the various specified fields, without there being any nexus of either of these fields to the object of the Act of 2005, is violative of the fundamental constitutional values.

    (iii) Usage of extremely vague and general terminology like social service, mass media and alike terms, being indefinite and undefined, would lead to arbitrariness and are open to abuse.

    (iv) This vagueness and uncertainty is bound to prejudicially affect the administration of justice by such Commissions or Tribunals which are vested with wide adjudicatory and penal powers. It may not be feasible for a person of ordinary experience to deal with such subjects with legal accuracy.

    (v) The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners at the State and Centre level perform judicial and/or quasi-judicial functions under the Act of 2005 and therefore, it is mandatory that persons with judicial experience or majority of them should hold these posts.

    (vi) The fundamental right to equality before law and equal protection of law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution enshrines in itself the person's right to be adjudged by a forum which exercises judicial power in an impartial and independent manner consistent with the recognised principles of adjudication.

    (vii) Apart from specifying a high powered committee for appointment to these posts, the Act of 2005 does not prescribe any mechanism for proper scrutiny and consultation with the judiciary in order to render effective performance of functions by the office holders, which is against the basic scheme of our Constitution.

    (viii) Even if the Court repels the attack to the constitutionality of the provisions, still, keeping in view the basic structure of the Constitution and the independence of judiciary, it is a mandatory requirement that judicial or quasi-judicial powers ought to be exercised by persons having judicial knowledge and expertise. To that extent, in any case, these provisions would have to be read down. Resultantly, limitation has to be read into the competence of the legislature to prescribe requisite qualifications for appointment of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals.

    Discussion

  7. The Constitution of India expressly confers upon the courts the power of judicial review. The courts, as regards the...

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