Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated Peace
| Published date | 01 April 2016 |
| Date | 01 April 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797015626046 |
| Author | Nathan Gilbert Quimpo |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Mindanao: Nationalism,
Jihadism and Frustrated
Peace
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo1
Abstract
This article examines why the decades-old Moro insurgency in Mindanao,
southern Philippines, has remained difficult to resolve, and how recent
international developments, such as the jihadization of once secular ethno-
nationalist movements and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
have influenced it. The author argues that jihadism made significant inroads
in the Moro nationalist struggle already in the 1990s, way before 9/11, and
that since 2007, a more moderate Islamism has gained ascendancy. He argues
further that the Moro insurgency has remained intractable because of grave
errors committed by the Arroyo and Aquino administrations; recurrent out-
bursts of anti-Moro hysteria incited by demagogic politicians; and a continuing
weak third-party role in the Mindanao peace process. He warns that the
apparent collapse of the most recent peace pact between the government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) poses the danger of the possible rise
of new ISIS-linked jihadist groups.
Keywords
Insurgency, nationalism, jihadism, Mindanao, peace
Introduction
The Moro insurgency in Mindanao, southern Philippines, which dates back to the
early 1970s, is one of Asia’s longest running rebel movements. At the outset, it
sought to establish an independent state for the Moro people, who belong to
13 predominantly Muslim ethnic groups living in Mindanao and nearby islands.
Various rebel groups have been involved in the insurgency, the most prominent
Article
1
Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Tsukuba, Japan.
Corresponding author:
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba,
1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8571, Japan.
E-mail: quimpo.nathan.fn@u.tsukuba.ac.jp
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
3(1) 64–89
2016 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797015626046
http://aia.sagepub.com
Quimpo 65
ones being the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The conflict between
the Philippine government and the Moro rebels—said to be one of Asia’s deadliest
ethnic conflicts—has claimed the lives of 120,000 people and displaced two
million people. On-and-off peace negotiations between the two sides have resulted
in several peace agreements, none of which has succeeded in bringing about a
stable and enduring peace in Mindanao. The latest peace pact, the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), signed by the government and the MILF
in March 2014, is in danger of turning out to be a stillbirth as the administration-
sponsored bill for Bangsamoro1 autonomy is undergoing very rough sailing in the
Philippine Congress and appears unlikely to be passed.
Over the past decade, some scholars have noted the growing influence of
extremist Islamist ideology on armed separatist movements in different parts of
Asia. The trend towards the jihadization of once secular ethno-nationalist move-
ments has been observed in areas such as Chechnya (Hughes, 2008), Kashmir
(Garner, 2013) and Xinjiang (Potter, 2013). Jihadism suffered a major setback
with the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2012. However, the rise
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its aggressive recruitment of
foreign fighters and international network building appear to have given fresh
impetus to the jihadist cause.
Why has the Moro insurgency proven so difficult to resolve? How have recent
international developments, such as the rise of the ISIS, influenced it? What are
the prospects for a realistic compromise solution to the Mindanao conflict? Unlike
other scholarly pieces of literature that have analyzed the Mindanao conflict and
peace process in a somewhat unilinear manner (including those of the author), this
article divides this protracted process into three periods, with a particular
ideological strain dominant or salient in each period: the first period, from the
1970s to the 1980s, in which Moro nationalists dominated; the second period,
from the 1990s to around 2006, in which extreme Islamism—jihadism—made
significant inroads into the Moro struggle; and the third period, from 2007 to the
present, when a more moderate Islamism gained clear ascendancy. It is underscored
here that in the case of the Moro struggle, jihadism encroached way before 9/11,
and that it has waned—at least for now.
Since the peace pacts that the government forged with the MNLF in 1976 and
1996 have already been well studied by scholars, this article focuses on the peace
process in the current period, especially the peace negotiations between the
government and the MILF. It is argued here that the Moro insurgency has
remained intractable because of grave blunders by the administrations of
presidents Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Simeon Aquino III; recurrent
outbursts of anti-Moro hysteria sparked off or stoked by demagogic politicians;
and a continuing weak third-party role in the Mindanao peace process.
The first section of this article discusses the rise of Moro nationalism in the
first period (from 1970s to 1980s) as well as its decline in the 1990s, and the failed
peace agreements with the MNLF. The next two sections deal with the second
period—jihadism’s inroads into the Moro movement, especially in the 1990s,
and the intense politico-military initiatives to counter jihadism in the initial years
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