Mass Politics and Institutional Restraint: Political Parties and the Election Commission of India

Published date01 June 2016
Date01 June 2016
AuthorManjari Katju
DOI10.1177/2321023016634945
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Mass Politics and Institutional
Restraint: Political Parties and
the Election Commission of India
Manjari Katju1
Abstract
This article looks at the working of institutional relationships in Indian politics. It explores the
interaction between Indian political parties and the Election Commission of India to highlight the
dynamics of political praxis and institutional restraint, and while doing so endorses the view that
institutional regulation is a vital part of a free and fair democratic exercise. It also argues that the institutional
‘logic of appropriateness’ is being transformed at a time of greater participation in political competition
in India: the number of candidates contesting the polls has grown phenomenally, as has the number
of people coming out to vote. In this context, regulation and restraint have assumed an importance
essential for responsible political practice and the institutionalization of the multiparty system itself.
Keywords
Democracy, elections, Election Commission of India, political parties
This article focuses on the working of institutional relationships in Indian politics. It explores the nature
of interaction between Indian political parties and the Election Commission of India (hereafter EC), and
the implication of this relationship for Indian democracy. Political parties represent political praxis
and public opinion, whereas institutions such as the EC regulate political praxis through institutional
checks. This article makes an attempt to answer the following questions: What has been the relation
between political parties and the EC in India within the dynamics of the agency–structure relationship?
Do political representatives, that is, those representing political agency, feel reasonably able to articulate
their interests within the existing institutional regulations, or do they regard the latter as unjustified con-
straints on democratic exercise? Do the political restraints imposed by institutions hinder democratic
exercise or are they needed to restrain abuses of power? And, following from this, are rules and rule-
enforcing bodies needed for the democratic functioning of political praxis in India, or can the political
system autonomously manage disagreements on its own?
To answer these questions, the article looks at some instances since the early 2000s—a time when
tensions between political parties and the EC over electoral procedure in India saw a visible growth
1 Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad, Telangana, India.
Studies in Indian Politics
4(1) 77–89
© 2016 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2321023016634945
http://inp.sagepub.com
Corresponding author:
Manjari Katju, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, Gachibowli, Hyderabad—500046,
Telangana, India.
E-mails: mkatju@gmail.com; mkss@uohyd.ernet.in

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