Limits of India–US Relations: Balancing Through Strategic Autonomy and Multi-alignment
| Published date | 01 December 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241282071 |
| Author | Josukutty C. Abraham,Uma Purushothaman |
| Date | 01 December 2024 |
Research Article
Limits of India–US
Relations: Balancing
Through Strategic
Autonomy and
Multi-alignment
Josukutty C. Abraham1 and Uma Purushothaman2,3
Abstract
The India–US relationship has often been described as a defining partnership. But the
nature of the friendship in actuality is yet to assume depth. Despite convergences
at multiple levels, it falls short of a true strategic partnership or deep friendship. The
India–US relationship is neither a trusted nor an assured economic or security part-
nership. It is often tested by the vagaries of real-time issues, especially involving other
great powers. That is why, despite signing the civilian nuclear deal, foundational agree-
ments, being members of the Quad and Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, and with the
common objective of containing the rise of China, they are unable to work closely
together on myriad bilateral, international and regional issues. There are differences
over matters of primary interests and the type of partnership that each wants to
establish. The United States was insensitive to Indian concerns in its abrupt draw-
down from Afghanistan in 2021, sub-continental security threats emanating from the
China–Pakistan axis and its continued military support to Pakistan. India’s neutral
stand (read in the United States as being pro-Russian) in the Ukraine crisis marked by
its abstention from voting against Russia in the UN and purchase of Russian oil despite
strong objections from the US-led Western camp are cases in point. We argue that
India’s US policy is a case of limited balancing dictated by compulsions and lacks depth.
For rising India, a continued desire for strategic autonomy and multi-alignment—the
post-non-alignment foreign policy principles—guides its foreign policy orientation. For
Washington, a deeper relationship would imply India abandoning its visions of strate-
gic autonomy and joining more formally in Washington’s orbit. These core national
objectives of the two countries limit the level of partnership they can forge.
Keywords
India, United States, alignment, balancing
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
11(4) 496–514, 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/23477970241282071
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1 Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India
2 Department of International Relations and Politics, Central University of Kerala, Kasaragod,
Kerala, India
3 Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Corresponding author:
Josukutty C. Abraham, Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram,
Kerala 695581, India.
E-mail: cajosukutty@gmail.com
Abraham and Purushothaman 497
Introduction
The international system is going through extraordinary transformations with the
emergence of new powers, the relative decline of the US, the Russia–Ukraine crisis,
the growth of artificial intelligence, climate change, pandemics and so on. Shifts in
the distribution of power in the international system of this nature are ripe with the
possibility of instability. In this context, relations between the two largest democra-
cies, India and the US, deserve closer attention. Despite having many similar values,
the Indo-US relationship falls short of a full-spectrum partnership and much below
an alliance. This article attempts to examine why this is the case.
The Indo-US relationship has been variously described as ‘natural allies’ and a
‘defining partnership of the century’ by the leaders of the two countries. However,
the ideals and concepts of the foreign policy of India and the US are divergent
with different goals. The most significant question is then what brings them
together. The basic values of democracy which they claim constitute the basis of
their bilateral relations are on the decline in both countries according to many
scholars (see, for instance, Arvanitopoulos, 2022; Verma, 2023). They have com-
peting regional and global interests. It is their mutual material and strategic inter-
ests that matter the most in the relationship. For the US, it is to sustain its global
hegemony by meeting the challenge posed by China and for India, its own eco-
nomic and technological developments and the ambition to become a great power.
Thus, it is the common desire for balancing China in the context of regional secu-
rity considerations and changing dynamics of global politics that matters most in
India–US relations.
We contend that the India–US relationship is neither a trusted nor an assured
economic or security partnership or friendship. It is often tested by the vagaries of
real-time issues, especially involving other great powers. That is why despite
signing the civilian nuclear deal and foundational agreements, being members
of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), and having the common objective of contain-
ing the rise of China, they are unable to work together on myriad bilateral, inter-
national and regional issues. There are differences over matters of primary
interests and the type of partnership that each wants to form and is committed to.
The US was insensitive to Indian concerns in its abrupt drawdown from
Afghanistan in 2021, sub-continental security threats emanating from the China–
Pakistan axis and its continued military support to Pakistan. India’s neutral stand
(read in the US as being pro-Russian) in the Ukraine crisis marked by its absten-
tion from voting against Russia in the UN and purchase of Russian oil despite
strong objections from the US-led Western camp are cases in point. We argue that
India’s US policy is a case of balancing dictated by compulsions and lacks depth.
For rising India, the continued desire/adherence to strategic autonomy and mul-
ti-alignment guides its foreign policy orientation. For Washington, a deeper rela-
tionship would imply India abandoning its visions of strategic autonomy and
joining more formally in Washington’s orbit. These divergent core national objec-
tives/positions limit the level of the partnership they can forge.
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