Special Civil Application No. 18610 of 2013. Case: Larsen and Toubro Kamdar Union Vs State of Gujarat. High Court of Gujarat (India)
| Case Number | Special Civil Application No. 18610 of 2013 |
| Counsel | For Appellant: Shirish Joshi and Sachin D. Vasavada, Advs. and For Respondents: Prakash Jani and K.S. Nanvati, Advs. |
| Judges | Paresh Upadhyay, J. |
| Issue | Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 10, 10(1)(d), 10(3), 10A, 2(n)(vi), 22, 23, 24 |
| Citation | 2014 (141) FLR 836 |
| Judgement Date | March 21, 2014 |
| Court | High Court of Gujarat (India) |
Judgment:
Paresh Upadhyay, J.
-
Challenge in this petition is made to the Notifications dated 16.12.2013 and 19.12.2013 issued by the respondent No. 1-State of Gujarat. The Notification dated 16.12.2013 was issued by the Government in exercise of powers under section 2(n)(vi) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ('the Act' for short), declaring the services of the workers of the respondent No. 2-Larsen & Toubro Limited, Hazira Project, Surat, as an essential service, for a period of six months. By the subsequent notification dated 19.12.2013, the Government, in exercise of powers under section 10(1)(d) of the Act, referred the industrial dispute, pertaining to certain demands of the workers of the respondent No. 2-Company to the Industrial Tribunal, Surat for adjudication. By the said notification itself, Government has, in exercise of its powers under section 10(3) of the Act, prohibited the workers of respondent No. 2-Company from continuing the strike, which they had started from 16.12.2013. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, this Court finds that, the matter requires consideration. Rule.
2.1 Learned advocates are heard at length on the question of interim relief.
2.2 The case of the petitioner-Union is mainly founded on the allegation that, the bargaining capacity of the workers as against the Management of respondent No. 2-Industry would be a no match, but even then, the Authorities of the Government in exercise of the powers have taken the side of the Management, under the pretext of industrial peace and adjudication of the industrial dispute. It is submitted that if the chronology of events as emerging from record is seen, it leaves no room but to conclude that the exercise of powers by the Government in the present case is not bona fide. Learned advocate for the petitioner-Union has placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Delhi Administration, Delhi v. Workmen of Edward Keventers 1978 (37) FLR 116 (SC): (1978-79) 15 SCLJ 224, to contend that, only nine out of eleven demands are referred to for adjudication and thus the prohibitory orders would not apply to the petitioner-Union since the strike in question can be termed as for those two demands also. It is further submitted that under the pretext of the strike being illegal, the Management has already started taking actions in very high-handed manner and the very cure is turning out to be worse than the disease itself which is pretended to be cured by the Government. It is submitted that the impugned Notifications be stayed.
2.3 On the other hand, learned Government Pleader as well as learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No. 2, both have vehemently contended that, both the Notifications of the Government i.e. dated 16.12.2013 and 19.12.2013 were within the competence of the Government, the circumstances demanded exercise of that power and it was necessary in the public interest to do so. It is submitted that under these circumstances, no interference be made by this Court. It is also submitted that, when the Government has issued notification, presumption is always in favour of it being bona fide. Learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 has taken this Court through the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. To make this point good, reliance is placed on the following decisions.
(i) The Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J. Bahadur 1980 Lab. I.C. 1218,
(ii) Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. Dunlop India Ltd. 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 753,
(iii) Vishala v. State of Gujarat 1999 (2) GCD 892 (Guj.),
(iv) Empire Industries Limited v. State of Maharashtra 2010 (125) FLR 337 (SC),
2.4 It is also contended on behalf of the State as well as respondent No. 2 both that, grant of interim relief at this stage in favour of the petitioner workers, even against the further implementation of the Notification dated 19.12.2013 would amount to allowing the petition at this stage, and it is a settled position of law that interim relief should not be granted which ultimately results in allowing the petition. In support of this contention, the following decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India are relied by him.
(i) Dayanand Vedic Vidyala Sanchalak Samiti v. Education Inspector, Greater Bombay (2007) 15 SCC 192,
(ii) Secretary, U.P.S.C. v. S. Krishna Chaitanya: AIR 2011 SC 3101,
(iii) Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2014 SC 33,
-
Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, and also the additional material which was made available to this Court by the learned Government Pleader during the course of hearing, this Court finds that the petitioner-workers are entitled to interim protection during the pendency of this petition. The circumstances and the factors which have weighed with this Court, to come to this conclusion, are as under. Further, the arguments of learned advocates, for and against grant of interim relief, and the factors which have weighed with this Court, are interwoven and therefore, they are recorded together as under. It is recorded that, there can not be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law or the submission of learned advocate for the respondents, however in the facts and circumstances, which are narrated hereinafter, this Court finds that, refusal to grant interim relief in favour of the petitioner-workers would result into miscarriage of justice and therefore, interim protection is required to be granted.
-
At the outset, it is recorded that, the impugned Notification dated 16.12.2013 is cancelled ab initio by the Government, vide Notification dated 19.3.2014. The circumstances leading to it and effect thereof is recorded hereinafter.
-
The principal challenge is to the Notifications dated 16.12.2013 (now withdrawn) and 19.12.2013, as referred above. As noted, the Notification dated 16.12.2013 was issued by the Government in exercise of powers under section 2(n)(vi) of the Act, declaring the services of the workers of the respondent No. 2, as an essential service, for a period of six months. By the subsequent Notification dated 19.12.2013, the Government, in exercise of powers under section 10(1)(d) of the Act, referred the industrial dispute, pertaining to nine, out of eleven demands of the workers of the respondent No. 2-Company to the Industrial Tribunal, Surat for adjudication. By the self same Notification, Government has, in exercise of its powers under section 10(3) of the Act, prohibited the workers of respondent No. 2-Company from continuing the strike, which they had started from 16.12.2013. Since the said Notification dated 16.12.2013 is withdrawn by the Government now, it is only the notification dated 19.12.2013, the legality, propriety and sustainability of which need to be gone into. Though, the Notification dated 16.12.2013 is withdrawn, and therefore its legality is no more required to be gone into, the merits thereof would still be required to be referred to, to the limited extent of examining the effect of withdrawal of Notification dated 16.12.2013 vide notification dated 19.3.2014, while examining the legality, propriety...
To continue reading
Request your trial