Japan and the Revolution in Military Affairs
Author | Tom Le |
DOI | 10.1177/2347797018783112 |
Published date | 01 August 2018 |
Date | 01 August 2018 |
Article
Japan and the Revolution
in Military Affairs
Tom Le1
Abstract
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has not only changed how the USA
engages in warfare but also how it maintains its military supremacy and how
other nations budget and strategize. The very idea of the RMA has impacted
how nations manage their technological advantages and raises the questions
of can the RMA be monopolized and if not, which nations can adopt their
own RMA? In September 2000, the Japan Defence Agency (now the Ministry of
Defence [MOD]) produced a report titled ‘“Info-RMA”: Study on Info-RMA
and the Future of the Self-Defence Forces’ to explore the prospects of
implementing RMA principles in the Japan Self-Defence Forces. In this article,
I explore to what extent can RMA principles be implemented in the Self-
Defence Forces? I argue that although several significant changes have been
implemented in technology, doctrine, operations and organization, various
normative and technical constraints have directed the MOD to craft an RMA
with Japanese characteristics, emphasizing defence and interconnectedness
with the US armed forces. These findings suggest that current efforts to
‘normalize’ the Self-Defence Forces can succeed if crafted to appeal to the
sensibilities of the Japanese public.
Keywords
Japan, militarism, Revolution in Military Affairs, East Asia security, US–Japan alliance
Introduction
With the emergence of new international threats and rapid advances in techno-
logy since the end of the Cold War, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
has been increasingly discussed in security studies. Government leaders and
military strategists grapple with not only how to engage stateless threats such as
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
5(2) 172–196
2018 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797018783112
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/aia
1
Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA.
Corresponding author:
Tom Le, Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona College, 425 N. College Avenue, Claremont,
CA 91711, USA.
E-mail: tom.le@pomona.edu
Le 173
terrorism and cyberattacks but also how to do it efficiently when defence budgets
are shrinking and the general public is less willing to bear the costs of war.
Political scientists, historians and policymakers seek to determine whether the
RMA is applicable to states other than the USA and what implications the RMA
may have for future warfare?
The Japan Defence Agency (JDA) (now the Ministry of Defence/MOD) was
interested in the same questions, and in September 2000, the Office of Strategic
Studies (OSS) of the JDA produced a report titled ‘On Information-RMA’
[情報RMAについて], later summarized in English as ‘Info-RMA: Study on
Info-RMA and the Future of the Self-Defence Forces’, to explore the prospects
of implementing RMA principles in the Japan Self-Defence Forces (SDF).
Although at the time the JDA had no concrete policies, OSS officials believed
RMA-influenced ‘drastic changes’ to the JDA/SDF was inevitable and Japan
should ‘take advantage of the fruits of the information revolution and begin
the systematic study of the RMA’ (Japan Defence Agency [JDA] 2000a, p. 1).
Since the Info-RMA report, the MOD and the National Institute of Defence
Studies (NIDS) have produced additional reports on the applicability of the
RMA to Japan. However, due to concerns that the offensive potential of
the RMA could violate Japan’s exclusively defence-oriented policy and consti-
tutional commitment to not become a military power, it is unclear if Japan
could pursue its own RMA.
In this article, I address the question, ‘to what extent can RMA principles be
implemented in the SDF?’ I argue that although several key changes have been
instituted in the SDF, various constraints will direct the MOD to craft an RMA
with Japanese characteristics, emphasizing defence and interconnectedness
with the US Armed Forces. The Japan case has broad implications concerning
military norms. As a close US ally, Japan is sensitive to pressure to adopt US
warfare practices. Japan’s limitations indicate that although states are influenced
by US security policies and doctrines, they may have difficulty implementing
them due to domestic constraints. Thus, although the USA drives much of the
theory on how to conduct warfare, it remains an outlier in practice.
Data for this article are primarily drawn from the Info-RMA report, the
original Japanese On Information-RMA report, Defence of Japan White Papers,
National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), Mid-term Defence Programs
(MTDP), National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS), Guidelines for Japan–US
Defence Cooperation, NIDS reports, MOD budgets and semi-structured elite
interviews. I utilize Saida Bé dar’s definition of the RMA to analyse the seven
principles that serve as basic guidelines for defence build-up outlined in
the Info-RMA report. According to Bé dar (2001), the RMA encompasses
three levels:
1. Technology: the integration of new IT into existing weapons systems
and integrated C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance);
2. Doctrine and operations: experimenting with technology to create new types
of warfare; and
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