Institutionalizing a Coalitional System and Games within Coalitions in India (1996–2014)

Published date01 December 2014
AuthorK.K. Kailash
DOI10.1177/2321023014551875
Date01 December 2014
Subject MatterArticles
Military-Madrasa-Mullah Complex 185
India Quarterly, 66, 2 (2010): 133–149
A Global Threat 185
Article
Institutionalizing a Coalitional
System and Games within
Coalitions in India (1996–2014)
K.K. Kailash
Abstract
Rather than looking at coalition formation as a single-shot game, this article attempts a more dynamic
analysis by exploring the interactive processes between different experiments over time. Comparing
coalition experiments since 1996, it finds that there is an inbuilt tension in the nature of the coa-
lition formations in India. India’s federalized party system created a distinctive coalition formation
pattern in which territory played a significant part. Its coalitions primarily involved the coming
together of two types of parties, polity-wide and single-state parties. The organizational logic of the
two categories of parties is different and consequently the incentives that drive them vary. While their
coming together in a coalition does help fulfil some ‘mutual needs’ there is also an element of com-
petition about issues including how much and whose needs are being fulfilled. While polity-wide parties
would prefer to govern alone or have a system in which the role of the coalitionable is negligible, this
article argues that the combined effect of both federalization of the party system and an institutionaliza-
tion of a coalitional system has decreased the possibility of single-party governments in the short run.
The article also notes that incongruent majorities in the two houses, the need to get policy passed and
the changing composition of the Rajya Sabha during the tenure of the Lok Sabha will encourage the
formation of large coalitions and/or surplus coalitions.
Keywords
Coalitions, polity-wide parties, single-state parties, federalization, National Democratic Alliance, United
Progressive Alliance, dynamic analysis, layering, intra-coalition competition
From standing isolated, unable to attract new support partners after the 11th General Elections to form-
ing a surplus majority coalition government in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has travelled
a long way. So also has the politics of coalitions. Six successive coalitions after the scrappy experiment
of 1996, the BJP is now an adept coalition-maker. Through this period, short-lived unstable multiparty
governments have given way to coalition governments that have not only completed their term but have
also been re-elected. Seven successive elections prior to this election did not produce any clear winners
and governments were products of bargains between political parties before, during and after the
elections. The BJP, in May 2014, became the first party in 30 years to have a majority of its own in
the Lok Sabha. Yet, it has chosen to lead a coalition rather than go it alone. Why?
K.K. Kailash, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad.
E-mail: kkkss@uohyd.ernet.in
Studies in Indian Politics
2(2) 185–202
© 2014 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2321023014551875
http://inp.sagepub.com
186 K.K. Kailash
Studies in Indian Politics, 2, 2 (2014): 185–202
While polity-wide parties may still fancy single-party governments, that urge has been tempered by
two distinctive features of the post-Congress polity (Palshikar, Suri & Yadav, 2014). This article argues
that the combined effect of both federalization of the party system and an institutionalization of a coali-
tional system has decreased the possibility of single-party governments in the short run. The concept of
federalization of the party system was first expounded by Arora (2000) based on his study of the three
elections in the 1990s which inaugurated the coalition era to show how territorialization of parties had a
distinctive impact on coalition formation. I argue that while the broad contours of federalization remain
intact, the internal positioning of the components has undergone a distinctive shift, further reinforcing
the possibility of coalitions.
At a second level, there has also been an institutionalization of a coalition system. The way parties
work and interact with each other, their preferences, perceptions and the general discourse both during
elections and otherwise, as well how they evaluate alternatives, their expectations and of course their
strategies are all based on the broad understanding that no party is likely to command a majority on its
own in parliament and would require the support of others. The understanding and internalization of the
working of a competitive and federalized party system as well as an awareness of ‘how things work here’
has led to the politics of coalitions itself becoming normalized.
While federalization of the party system and institutionalization of a coalitional system will make
coalitions stay, the structure of the coalitional system depends on the games within a coalition. The
internal rearrangement of the federalized party system has sharpened the lines of conflict, between
the coalition-makers and the coalitionable. The organizational logic of the two main categories of
parties, the polity-wide who also happen to be the coalition-makers and single-state parties, who form
the pool of coalitionable, is different and consequently the incentives that drive them vary. While their
coming together in a coalition does help fulfil some ‘mutual needs’, there is also an element of com-
petition about issues including how much and whose needs are being fulfilled. This means that
the internal dynamics of coalitions must also be examined to comprehend the trajectory of coalition
politics.
This article is structured as follows. The first section attempts to draw a framework to make sense of
the institutionalization of a coalition system in India. In the second section, I map the federalization
of party system focusing on specific features which reinforce the continuation of a coalitional system.
The subsequent section presents a dynamic perspective of coalitions examining interactions between
different coalition experiments since 1996. It finds that while coalitions have been taken for granted
there is a tussle to shape the coalitional system to the needs of the main actors, the polity-wide and
single-state parties. The final section summarizes and concludes.
Analytical Framework
I draw insights from three distinctive strands of literature including, the ‘nested-game’ framework,
dynamic theory of coalitions as well as institutional change through layering to make sense of the
trajectory of coalition politics in India. Most studies of coalitions tend to focus only on the co-
operative dimension of the coming-together of political parties. However, mutual interests between
parties alone do not give us the complete picture as any coalition is always characterized by both
‘cooperative and competitive tensions’ between partners (Tsebelis, 1988a). The ‘nested-game’

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