India–China Standoff in Ladakh and China’s Dilemma

Published date01 July 2023
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/00208817231201754
AuthorRaj Verma
Date01 July 2023
https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817231201754
International Studies
60(3) 259 –282, 2023
© 2023 Jawaharlal Nehru University
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DOI: 10.1177/00208817231201754
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Research Article
India–China Standoff
in Ladakh and China’s
Dilemma
Raj Verma1
Abstract
This article seeks to provide an answer to the question which has not been
explored in the relevant academic scholarship: What are the merits and demerits
of China restoring status quo ante or maintaining status quo along the disputed
Line of Actual Control and why? This article argues that status quo renders China
multiple geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic advantages: restoring its
1960s claim line and tactical and strategic gains along the LAC, security of Aksai
Chin and inhibiting India’s rise. However, it also creates prospects for India–
China conflict/war which will curtail (a victorious) China’s quest to become the
pre-eminent global power. And a defeat/stalemate in conflict/war with India will
impact China’s standing in global affairs, and repercussions for Communist Party
of China’s regime stability and regime survival. On the other hand, restoring
status quo ante also has tactical and strategic costs, and can also have domestic
political costs for President Xi Jinping.
Keywords
CPC and Xi Jinping, CPEC and Xinjiang, India-China-US-Pakistan, Indo-Pacific,
Ladakh–Aksai Chin, Tibet
In the beginning of May 2020, according to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
India, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) intruded into the disputed and
un-demarcated territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to unilaterally
change the status quo (MEA, 2020).1 India countered Chinese transgressions in
May 2020 which led to standoffs, fisticuffs and brawls between Indian and Chinese
troops in different areas along the LAC. On the night of 15–16 June, Indian and
Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley in which 20 Indian soldiers and an
undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers were killed.2 Thus, China has discarded all
the confidence-building measures established in the last three decades and violated
all the border cooperation agreements signed by the two countries.3
Corresponding author:
Raj Verma, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies
University, 1550 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang campus, Shanghai 201613, China.
E-mail: rajneeshverma2000@gmail.com
1School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University,
Songjiang campus, Shanghai, China
260 International Studies 60(3)
According to Subramaniam Jaishankar, India’s Minister of External Affairs,
China has provided ‘five differing explanations’ for its actions in Ladakh. He did
not elaborate on the reasons (Laskar, 2020). Scholars and analysts have provided
multiple explanations for China’s intrusions along the LAC in May 2020. Some
scholars like Ashley Tellis aver that China’s intrusions are a part of its ‘salami
slicing’ technique of land grab. This entails encroaching on small parts of a
country’s territory over a long period of time. China has been undertaking ‘salami
slicing’ along the LAC and also the South China Sea for some time (Sarkar, 2020).
Others have pointed to domestic factors which prompted China to intrude along
the LAC. They argue that the COVID-19 outbreak in China damaged China’s
reputation globally and negatively impacted its economy. Beijing undertook
military action and followed a more aggressive foreign policy to exhibit strength
and ward of international perceptions of weakness in light of international
criticism of its handling of COVID-19 pandemic. Others have argued that India’s
burgeoning relations with the US caused the intrusions. Beijing is sending a signal
to New Delhi to check/limit its relations with Washington. Washington perceives
New Delhi as a lynchpin of its Indo-Pacific strategy and Beijing perceives New
Delhi as an instrument of Washington’s containment/constrainment strategy
towards China. Some have argued that Beijing wants to highlight the disparity in
material capabilities between India and China, and wants India to fall in line and
accept China as the pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific. Others highlight the
difference in material capabilities between the two countries which favours China
as the reason for China’s actions along the LAC. They argue that China has
become more aggressive as its material capabilities have increased (Kaura, 2020;
Verma, 2020a; Westcott, 2021; Interviews with Indian analysts and retired armed
forces personnel, 2023).
Majority of the analysts are of the opinion that the principal reason for China’s
incursions in Ladakh is India’s Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah’s statement
regarding restoration of Aksai Chin and Pakistan-administered Kashmir into
India, and the construction of border infrastructure especially the nearly complete
255-km Darbuk-Shyokh (DS)–Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) (DS-DBO) road. China
perceives that the construction of the DS-DBO road mitigates its military and
strategic advantage along the LAC. The DS-DBO road (Figure 2) raises China’s
anxieties regarding Aksai Chin. The road connects DBO military airbase with Leh
in Ladakh and allows for faster movement of troops and equipment to the LAC.
Control over DS-DBO requires control over a ridge line in the Galwan Valley
(Galwan Valley is circa 5 km from DS-DBO road) which provides access to Aksai
Chin (where G-219 passes). G-219 has extremely high strategic value for China
because it is the only all-weather road accessible throughout the year to the
Tibetan plateau from mainland China. The loss of this road/highway will
jeopardize the security of China’s entire western periphery. This prompted China
to intrude along the LAC to prevent India from boosting infrastructure along the
LAC (Kaura, 2020; Verma, 2020a; Westcott, 2021). This explanation for China’s
military action in Ladakh in May 2020 is the premise of this article.4
As of 10 May 2023, Chinese forces have withdrawn from Galwan,
Finger 4–Finger 8 in the Pangong Tso Lake area in Ladakh, Gogra and Hot

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