Gujarat Elections: The Sub-Text of Modi’s ‘Hattrick’—High Tech Populism and the ‘Neo-middle Class’
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| Author | Christophe Jaffrelot |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| DOI | 10.1177/2321023013482789 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Military-Madrasa-Mullah Complex 79
India Quarterly, 66, 2 (2010): 133–149
A Global Threat 79
Article
Christophe Jaffrelot is at CERI, Sciences Po, Paris, and at the King’s India Institute (KCL).
E-mail: jaffrelot@orange.fr
Gujarat Elections: The Sub-Text
of Modi’s ‘Hattrick’—High
Tech Populism and the
‘Neo-middle Class’1
Christophe Jaffrelot
Abstract
This article, while it will pay attention to the opposition parties—the Congress and the GPP—intends,
in its first part, to scrutinize the mainstays of Narendra Modi’s election campaign with special refer-
ences to high tech populism, his banalization of Hindutva, his notion of Gujarati patriotism and his
defence of what he calls the ‘neo-middle class’. The second part that deals with the electoral results
and the citizens’ voting behaviour, will show that Modi’s constituency is a by-product of an increasingly
polarized pattern of social change and economic growth, the BJP receiving stronger support from urban
dwellers, whatever their caste, gender and level of education may be.
Keywords
Gujarat, Narendra Modi, state elections, Hindutva
In December 2012 Narendra Modi joined a very selective club of non-Congress Chief Ministers: along
with Jyoti Basu and, more recently, Navin Patnaik, he’s one of the few who have been re-elected twice.
If we believe him, his success has to be attributed to his achievements—especially those in terms of
development—whereas his detractors highlight more his authoritarian methods and his marketing tech-
niques that the financial support of the corporate sector allows.
Certainly, the BJP is winning the Gujarat elections since 1995—a record—by default, for political and
social reasons: the Congress does not offer a very convincing alternative in the state and the low caste as well
as Dalit parties2—which have played the role of game changers in the Hindi belt since the 1990s—are con-
spicuous by their absence (Jaffrelot, 2012c). However, Narendra Modi’s last election campaign shows that
he has also capitalized on a rather new and effective populist style and that he knows how to address issues
that are causes for concern to the middle class, an expanding group that definitely is his constituency.
This article, while it will pay attention to the opposition parties—the Congress and the GPP—intends,
in its first part, to scrutinize the mainstays of Modi’s election campaign in technical terms, with special
references to high tech populism, as well as in thematic terms with special references to his banalization
of Hindutva, his notion of Gujarati patriotism and his defence of what he calls the ‘neo-middle class’.
The second part, that is dealing with the electoral results and the citizens’ voting behaviour, will indeed
show that Modi’s constituency is a by-product of a very polarized pattern of economic growth, the BJP
receiving an increasingly important support from urban dwellers, whatever their caste, gender and level
of education may be.
Studies in Indian Politics
1(1) 79–95
© 2013 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/2321023013482789
http://inp.sagepub.com
80 Christophe Jaffrelot
Studies in Indian Politics, 1, 1 (2013): 79–95
The Electoral Campaign: High Tech Populism Takes Over
The BJP has inherited from the RSS a collective ethos that reflects the motto of the Sangh: organization
first (Jaffrelot, 1999). This emphasis on the organization (the ‘sangathan spirit’) explains the resilience
of the Sangh Parivar and the way it has contained factionalism, in contrast to the situation prevailing in
the Shiv Sena (whose division was largely due to the personalization and patrimonialization orchestrated
by Bal Thackeray). But Narendra Modi, in spite of his past records as an RSS pracharak, has turned his
back on the team spirit and has personalized politics within the BJP as early as 2002 at the expense of the
old organic relations between the party and the RSS.
Modi vs the Sangh Parivar?
In 2007 already, the Swayamasevaks had not been asked by Nagpur to canvass systematically in
favour of Modi in Gujarat (Jaffrelot, 2009). Five years later, the gap between him and the RSS had
widened. The Sangh parivar local leaders resent the way their movements have been sidelined by the
Chief Minister. In ten years or so the number of Shakhas has diminished from 1,500 to one thousand
and attendance is ‘down by an estimated 50 per cent’ (Umat, 2012a). In the early years of the last decade,
the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) had 94,000 members—it has retained half of them
only. The Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS)—which had 22.5 lakh members in 2003—is only 6 lakh
large today. This trend is sometimes due to issue-based conflicts (for instance Modi has fought
against the BKS after the organization mobilized farmers on the electricity issue—we’ll return to the
problem that Modi has with the rural part of Gujarat). But it reflects also his will to emancipate
himself from the BJP’s fellow-travellers (Pravin Togadia, the VHP leader was, for instance, totally
marginalized).
Not a team player within his own Hindutva family, Modi has antagonized former colleagues like
Sanjay Joshi, his main rival in the Sangh Parivar of Gujarat, whom he has had expelled from the BJP
National Executive in 2012. His non-accommodative attitude is also one of the reasons why former
Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel—Modi’s predecessor—started a new political party, the Gujarat
Parivartan Party (GPP) with other dissidents in spite of his age (he was 84).
But the RSS is clearly facing a dilemma. On the one hand the Sangh which works collegially and
insists on the merger of egos in the organization resents Modi’s style and on the other hand he’s one of
their best winning cards. Therefore the doors were, and still are, apparently wide open for talks. On
October 21, 2012 Modi argued his case in Nagpur for three hours to contain the influence of his detrac-
tors (Joshi, Togadia and Keshubhai Patel). We do not know what has been the outcome of these in-
camera meetings, but in Gujarat, Modi could not fully rely on the support of the RSS volunteers who
either abstained from taking part in the campaign or supported Keshubhai—they often did it as old col-
leagues of the veteran politician.3 Incidentally, Keshubhai Patel left the BJP precisely because of the
‘self-centred’ style of functioning of Modi. Talking to VHP members he said:
When he [Modi] took over the state BJP, I told him that this race is altogether different. It’s called a ‘relay race’,
in which the baton is handed over from one participant to the other. Each one uses his strength and ultimately
the team wins, not an individual. But since Modi took the baton in this relay race, he has never passed it on. He
refuses to loosen his grasp over the party. (Ahmedabad Mirror, October 24, 2012)
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