Civil Appeal No. 5508 of 2003. Case: G. Vallikumari Vs Andhra Education Society and Ors.. Supreme Court (India)

Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 5508 of 2003
CounselFor Appearing Parties: P.P. Rao, L. Nageshwar Rao and A. Mariarputham, Sr. Advs., Anjani Aiyagari, B.K. Sood, Indra Sawhney, Manik Sood, Rajesh Kumar, Yogesh Kr. Bhatt, Asha G. Nair, Anil Katiyar and D.S. Mahra, Advs
JudgesG.S. Singhvi and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.
IssueDelhi School Education Act, 1973 - Sections 3(3), 4, 8 to 11, 12, 13 and 14; Gujarat School Education Act - Sections 51A and 52A; Kerala University Act, 1957 - Section 19; Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 - Rule 120, 120(1) and 120(2); Service Rules; Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 30(1)
CitationAIR 2010 SC 1105, JT 2010 (3) SC 75, 2010 (2) SCALE 1, (2010) 2 SCC 497
Judgement DateFebruary 02, 2010
CourtSupreme Court (India)

Judgment:

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. This appeal is directed against order dated 10.4.2002 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court whereby it allowed the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and declared Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (for short, `the Act') ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution and in so far applicability of the exclusion clause contained therein is restricted to unaided minority institutions, that Section 8(2) of the Act is not applicable to minority institutions and set aside the direction given by Delhi School Tribunal (for short, `the Tribunal') for reinstatement of the appellant with all consequential benefits.

2. Respondent No. 1 is a registered society formed with the primary object of imparting education to the children belonging to Andhra community living in Delhi. Respondent No. 2 is a private linguistic minority school established by respondent No. 1 and is aided by the Government of Delhi to the extent of 95%. The appellant was appointed as Upper Division Clerk (UDC) by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 w.e.f. 25.1.1988. Her appointment was approved by the Director of Education, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as `the Director'). In January, 1992, the appellant was granted permission by the management for doing Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resources Development Programme. After some time, the appellant applied for study leave for attending the training programme and also for preparing for the examination. She reported for duty after three days of the expiry of leave period, but the management of respondent No. 2 refused to accept her joining and initiated an inquiry against her on the charges of neglecting duties as UDC, availing leave without prior permission, absence from duty, misplacing the office records, failure to submit important office records/registers to the superiors and flouting the directions given by the management of the school. Shri Y.S. Rao, who was appointed as inquiry officer, submitted report dated 4.7.1995 with the findings that all the charges except charge No. 4 have been proved against the appellant. A copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the appellant along with notice dated 9.11.1995 proposing her removal from service. She filed reply dated 20.11.1995. After considering the same, the disciplinary committee recommended the appellant's removal from service. The Managing Committee accepted the same and sent letter dated 24.1.1996 to the Director seeking his approval in terms of Rule 120(2) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (for short, `the Rules'). The latter declined to approve the proposal. This was conveyed to the management vide letter dated 4.11.1996. Thereupon, the Managing Committee informed the Directorate of Education that its request for approval of the decision to remove the appellant may be treated as withdrawn. As a follow up, the Chairman of the Managing Committee passed order dated 30.11.1996 removing the appellant from service.

3. The appeal filed by the appellant against her removal from service was allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 24.7.2001 mainly on the ground of violation of Section 8(2) of the Act and Rule 120(2) of the Rules. The Tribunal referred to the judgments of this Court in Lily Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 124, Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of India (1986) 4 SCC 707 and Y. Theclamma v. Union of India (1987) 2 SCC 516, and held that the management of the school could not have removed the appellant from service without obtaining permission of the Director.

4. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 challenged the order of the Tribunal in W. P. No. 5088/2001 and made the following prayers:

(a) Declare Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 being not applicable to the aided religious/linguistic minority institutions, established under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

(b) Declare Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 in so far as it restricts its applicability to unaided minority schools, to be ultra vires of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

(c) Issue a Writ, order or direction thereby quashing the impugned judgment dated 24th July, 2001, passed by the Respondent No. 1 and declare that even in the case of aided minority school established under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, no prior approval within the meaning of Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, is required or contemplated and as such quash/set aside the order dated 24.7.2001 passed by Respondent No. 1 in the appeal filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3 and uphold the decision of petitioners thereby terminating the services of the respondent No. 3.

5. The Division Bench of the High Court briefly noticed the factual matrix of the case and the provisions of the Act, referred to the judgments of this Court in State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial Etc. 1970 (2) SCC 417, DAV College Etc. Etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1971 (2) SCC 269, Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1974 (1) SCC 717, Lily Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors. (supra), All Saints High School, Hyderabad and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. 1980 (2) SCC 478, Frank Anthony Public School Employee's Association v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), Y. Theclamma v. Union of India (supra), Anjuman-e-Mishbul Muslemin v. State of Bihar 1988 PLJR 1107, Association of Teachers in Anglo-Indian School v. The Association Aids Anglo-Indian School in India and others AIR 1995 Calcutta 194, All Bihar Christian Schools Association and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1988 (1) SCC 206, Bihar State Madarasa Education Board, Patna v. Madarsa Hanfia Arabic College, Jamalia and Ors. 1990 (1) SCC 428, Manohar Harries Walters v. Basel Mission Higher Education Center, Dharwad and Ors. 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 301, St. Johns Teachers Training Institute (For Women), Madurai and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. 1993 (3) SCC 595 and held that any provision which seeks to take away the right of the managing committee to pass any order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, would be violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Such a provision may, however, be upheld if an independent Tribunal wholly unconnected with the affairs of the institution as in the case of Delhi Act, or a provision is made to over-see that the governing body complies with the principles of natural justice.

The Division Bench then considered the questions whether Section 8(2) of the Act read with Rule 120(2) of the Rules confers unguided powers upon the Director to refuse to approve the action proposed to be taken by the management of the recognized private educational institutions against its employee and whether the direction given by the Tribunal for reinstatement of the appellant was legally correct and answered the same in the following words:

It is further incorrect to contend that Sub-section (2) of Section 8 does not suffer from unbridled power. As to what are the matters which are to be taken into consideration for grant or refusal of approval are not specified. In terms of Rule 120 no guidelines have been provided. Even no time limit has been provided within which such order should be passed. Such unbridled and unguided power, in our opinion, cannot be upheld.

In the instant case, the Tribunal has not found fault with the management in the matter of holding of domestic enquiry or disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. It was clearly held that not only the principles of natural justice have been complied with but also the provisions of Section 8 and Rule 120 have been complied with. No reason has been assigned as to why the approval was refused. It clearly goes to show that the Director of Education did not follow any principle which could tantamount to arbitrary exercise of power for exercising his statutory function. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Sub-section (2) of Section 8 cannot be held to have any application so far as minority institutions are concerned. In the instant case, no guidelines have also been provided by reason of Rule 120 of the Rules.

The Division Bench finally declared that Section 12 of the Act insofar as it restricts the applicability of the Act to...

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