Explaining the 2014 Lok Sabha Elections: Introduction
| Published date | 01 June 2015 |
| Date | 01 June 2015 |
| Author | Christophe Jaffrelot |
| DOI | 10.1177/2321023015575209 |
| Subject Matter | India’s 2014 Elections |
India’s 2014 Elections
Explaining the 2014 Lok Sabha
Elections: Introduction
The 16th Lok Sabha elections have made history for more than one reason. Not only the number of
registered voters—814 million—had never been so high, but the number of those who exercised their
franchise—554 millions—also broke a new record. Hence an unprecedented turnout (66.4 per cent),
partly due to the mobilization of women whose turnout jumped from 55.82 per cent in 2009 to 65.3 per
cent and partly due—to a lesser extent—to the introduction of a new button on the Electronic Voting
Machines known as (NOTA: None of the above), which allowed those who did not want to vote for any
candidate to take part in the election process (the NOTA voters represented 1.1 per cent of the total votes
cast). The number of candidates increased also from 8,070 to 8,251 and that of the parties from 363
to 464—the others were independents.
But for the first time since 1984, a single party won an absolute majority and for the first time in the
Indian history, this party was not the Congress but the BJP (with 282 seats). However, for the first time
(again!), this party won an absolute majority with less than 40 per cent of the valid votes—and in fact
much less than that: 31 per cent. This result comes from the fact that the BJP’s strongholds were all
concentrated in the north and the west of India.
Certainly, the BJP progressed in areas where it used to be weak, such as West Bengal, where it nearly
tripled its 2009 vote share (from 6.1 per cent to 16.8 per cent), Assam (from 17.2 per cent in 2009 to 36.4
per cent), Jammu and Kashmir (from 18.6 per cent to 32.4 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, Kerala (from
6.3 per cent to 10.3 per cent, its 1999 level), but these performances did not translate into many seats
(1 in Kerala, 2 in West Bengal, 3 in Jammu and Kashmir).
By contrast, the BJP scored remarkably in areas of northern and western India where it was already
strong. It won 190 of the 225 seats of the Hindi belt: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Rajasthan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Jharkhand—that is 84 per cent of the seats. That fig-
ure increases to 86 per cent if one adds Gujarat. It decreases to 80 per cent if one adds Maharashtra. But
if one includes the performance of its allies—including Apna Dal (2 seats in UP), Lok Janshakti Party
(6 seats in Bihar) and the Shiv Sena (18 seats in Maharashtra)—the BJP-led coalition bagged 86 per cent
of the seats in these 11 states. If the BJP obtained 31 per cent of the vote share nationally, it conquered
the Hindi belt states (and Gujarat) with 45 per cent of the average vote share. In Uttar Pradesh it sur-
passes in vote share its three opponents combined (Congress, BSP and SP) in 22 constituencies and won
an unprecedented 71 seats, out of 80 – which means that 25 per cent of its Lok Sabha MPs came from
this state.
For the Congress too, these elections were unprecedented. Never before had the party been reduced
to 44 seats (with 19 per cent of the votes), that is 60 seats less than in its first defeat against the BJP in
1998. The Congress has even failed to reach the 10 per cent seats bar required to obtain the status of
Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. By contrast, the regional parties remained very stable: they
won as many seats (212) as in 2009 (Jaffrelot & Verniers, 2015).
Studies in Indian Politics
3(1) 5–6
© 2015 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2321023015575209
http://inp.sagepub.com
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