Discourses of Exclusion: The Societal Securitization of Burma’s Rohingya (2012–2018)
| DOI | 10.1177/2347797018799000 |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| Author | Adam E. Howe |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Discourses of Exclusion:
The Societal Securitization
of Burma’s Rohingya
(2012–2018)
Adam E. Howe1
Abstract
The contemporary persecution of Burma’s Rohingya has rapidly evolved from iso-
lated episodes of communal violence into a global humanitarian crisis. The article
analyses the evolution of the recent violence in Rakhine State from 2012 to the
present. Specifically, I argue that Buddhist nationalist monks, including members
of the ‘969’ Movement and Ma Ba Tha, in concert with the Burmese government,
have acted as authoritative voices in society, depicting the Rohingya ethno-religious
group as an existential threat to the country’s majority Buddhist population. As
such, hate-filled rhetoric has provided a politically unstable Burmese regime with
an ideological justification for human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State.
This phenomenon is analysed through Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s securitiza-
tion thesis as a means of better understanding the discursive relationship among
Buddhist nationalist monks, the Burmese government and the Burmese Buddhists.
Ontologically, this article focuses on anti-Rohingya discourse and major episodes
of violence in western Burma’s Rakhine State from 2012 to 2018. As a discursive
process, securitization has not merely amplified Islamophobia within Burma, but
significantly endangers future generations of Rohingya civilians.
Keywords
Burma, Myanmar, Rohingya, securitization, ethnic conflict
Introduction
The contemporary plight of the Rohingya, well documented by human rights
observers and experts in the field, has only recently gained widespread attention
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
5(3) 245–266
2018 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797018799000
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/aia
1 Department of Politics and International Relations, Stephen J. Green School of International and
Public Affairs, Florida International University, Florida, USA.
Corresponding author:
Adam E. Howe, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, USA.
E-mail: ahowe015@fiu.edu
246 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 5(3)
from the international community. While periodic surges in Rohingya-targeted
violence have been an enduring feature of Burma state/society relations since the
1970s, the recent persecution represents the state’s most systematic effort to
remove the Rohingya from the state. Thus, episodes of extreme violence, post-
2012, should not be understood merely as the logical culmination of exclusionary
government policies over time. Rather, a surge in virulent rhetoric expressed by
certain members of nationalist monastic organizations and high-ranking officials
in the Burmese government, now represent a systematized attempt to delegitimize
the Rohingya’s physical presence in Burma.
Burmese military regimes, past and present, have systematically refused to
address widespread human rights violations committed against the Rohingya
population. Briefly recognized as ‘legitimate’ ethnic minorities during Burma’s
parliamentary democracy period (1948–1962), Rohingya civil rights gradually
eroded under Dictator Ne Win’s military regime (1962–1988). In 1974, under
Win’s new socialist constitution, the Rohingya were labelled as foreign citizens
and mandated to carry registration cards to distinguish them from native Burmans
(Ibrahim, 2016, p. 50). This was a crucial step in discrediting the Rohingya as an
ethnic group, perpetuating the dangerous myth that the Rohingya are merely
Bengalis living in Burma.
Rhetorically, Ne Win’s attitude towards the Rohingya was expressed through
his belief that non-Burmans were not to be trusted. As a ‘mixed blood’ race, the
Rohingya along with other ethnic minorities were viewed as sowers of division
(Wade, 2017, p. 55). Military operations in 1978 initiated under the guise of
deporting illegals, led to the exodus of over 200,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh.
The military junta’s relocation schemes in 1991 and 1997 severely restricted the
movement of the Rohingya within Rakhine State, charging locals hefty fees to
move from one village to the next (ibid., p. 93).
More recently, as explained in later sections, recent waves of anti-Rohingya vio-
lence have been met with complicity at the least, or active participation from Burmese
security forces (Tatmadaw). During President Obama’s meeting with former Burmese
President Thein Sein in 2012, Sein enunciated 11 principles for reform, one of which
was addressing humanitarian needs in Rakhine State (Sullivan, 2014). Since that
meeting, living conditions for Rohingya have deteriorated exponentially. Under the
guise of a new ‘democratic opening’, State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi and lead-
ing members of her National League for Democracy (NLD) party have refused to
substantively address the plight of the Rohingya.
As large numbers of ethnic Rohingya continue to live in deplorable conditions
in displacement camps, a spokesman for United to End Genocide (2016) writes,
‘The only decisive action the government has taken in Rakhine has been decid-
edly negative’. Currently, many Rohingya subsist in concentration camp-like con-
ditions with a host of restrictions placed on their freedom of movement. Since
2012, large numbers of Rohingya have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, Malaysia
and Thailand. Those who survived the journey have typically found few prospects
for integration into broader society. Recent Tatmadaw operations in Rakhine have
led to the mass exodus of Rohingya civilians, culminating in the United Nations’
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