Defining the Nature and Future of the Party–Military Relations in North Korea

Published date01 December 2018
Date01 December 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/2347797018798262
Subject MatterArticles
Defining the Nature and
Future of the Party–Military
Relations in North Korea
Jongseok Woo1
Abstract
Since Kim Jong-il officially launched his Songun politics in 1998, conflicting assess-
ments have generated two competing arguments regarding the political role of the
Korean People’s Army (KPA). The military garrison state argument suggests that
Songun politics brought about the decline of the party and political ascendance
of the military, while the party’s army model argues that the KPA is still the par-
ty’s army and under the party’s firm control. This article suggests that the debate
mischaracterizes the KPA’s political place in North Korea and that the military
has not been a politically influential organ from the state-building to the current
Kim Jong-un era. This article identifies two distinct patterns of military control
mechanisms—namely partisan (1960s–1990s) and personalistic (1998–2008)—and
argues that the different control methods have little to do with the KPA’s political
strength or weakness. Rather, they merely reflect the dictator’s ruling method of
choice for regime survival. The analysis illustrates that the current Kim Jong-un
regime is more stable than many outside observers may estimate, and a military
coup is highly unlikely in the near future.
Keywords
North Korea, Songun politics, coup d’état, party–military relations, Kim Jong-il
Introduction
Since Kim Jong-il officially launched his Songun (military first) politics in 1998,
the political role of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has attracted close scrutiny
from North Korean experts and policymakers alike. Kim’s Songun politics placed
the KPA at the forefront of his rule in order to survive both external and internal
challenges to his regime—a shift often interpreted as the political ascension of the
Article
Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs
5(3) 227–244
2018 SAGE Publications India
Private Limited
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2347797018798262
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/aia
1 School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, University of South Florida, Florida, USA.
Corresponding author:
Jongseok Woo, School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, University of South Florida, 4202 E. Fowler
Avenue SOC107, Tampa, Florida 33620, USA.
E-mail: wooj@usf.edu
228 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 5(3)
military in Pyongyang. A decade after the declaration, Kim Jong-il and his son
Jong-un seem to have switched from Songun politics and returned to Sondang
(party first) politics of the Kim Il-sung era (1948–1994). Under the current Kim
Jong-un leadership, KPA officers’ presence in key party and cabinet positions has
been significantly diminished, and these positions have been filled with new
(and younger) elites from the party and the cabinet.
One puzzling question is what the KPA’s place has been in the overall political
system in North Korea. Did Songun politics render the military a dominant political
force in Pyongyang’s power structure under Kim Jong-il? Contrariwise, has
Kim Jong-un’s Sondang (party first) policy substantially reduced the KPA’s
political clout (without any noticeable resistance from the military) and made the
military a mere servant to the party and Suryong (dear leader)? These questions
are critically important in assessing Pyongyang’s regime (in)stability because it
will ultimately be the military, not the organized opposition of ordinary people or
an external intervention, that may pose an immediate threat to regime security.
Interestingly enough, one may recognize that scholars disagree over the nature of
the military’s power and influence in the overall political power structure.
Some suggest that Kim Jong-il’s Songun politics made the KPA a politically
dominant institution that wields significant influence in the nation’s overall
decision-making process, which is termed in this article as the military garrison
state thesis (I. Kim, 2006; Mansourov, 2006; Woo, 2015). Others argue that North
Korea’s political system in general, and the KPA’s role in particular, remains
intact and the army remains a political servant that merely acts on Suryong’s and
his party’s will, which can be termed as the Sondang thesis (Haggard, Herman, &
Ryu, 2014; Lee, 2003; Park, 2013; Park, 2014; Woo, 2016).
One shared assumption between these opposite assessments is that the party’s
firm control of the military (i.e., Sondang) indicates a firm civilian control of the
military, a stable regime, and a low probability of a military coup in Pyongyang.
By the same token, Songun politics is assumed to be weak civilian control of the
military, the KPA’s political supremacy, and thus regime instability. This article
suggests that the debate over the KPA’s political influence has largely been misdi-
rected due to a lack of proper understanding about how Pyongyang’s political
system is structured and political power is exercised, especially related to the
military control mechanism. It argues that, unlike other communist totalitarian
states, the three Kims—Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un—have been
positioned above the ideological and political structure of the state and exercised
ultimate political authority over the entire populace. The three Kims often
mobilized the KPA to consolidate their political dominance. However, this does
not indicate the political ascendance of the military in North Korea, as the dicta-
tors designed a complex web of military control mechanisms—both interpersonal
and institutional—to prevent a military coup. Ultimately, the dictators’ move
between Songun and Sondang has been a mere reflection of their ruling method
of choice and, therefore, not a relevant indicator for the rise and fall of the KPA’s
political influence. To support the argument, this article comparatively analyses
two major shifts in party–army relations that transpired in North Korea since
1948: first in the 1950s–1960s and second between 1998 and 2008.

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