Clientelism and the Democratic Deficit
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/2321023016634915 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Clientelism and the
Democratic Deficit
Carolyn Elliott1
Abstract
This article examines the usefulness of the theory of clientelism for understanding the politics of Andhra
Pradesh (AP), where pressures to secure election funds as populations became more mobile led
political leaders to seek centralized control over state resources and access to private funds. Innovative
chief ministers sought new ways of relating to voters that undercut local leaders, leading to populist
politics and a shift towards programmatic politics that provided individual benefits rather than collective
benefits as under the prior system of patronage politics. These changes created a system that was more
amenable to individual leadership but also more vulnerable when the leadership collapsed. The theory
of clientelism provides a useful guide to the political and economic costs of this system, including the
democratic deficit, but does not provide for voters’ innovative responses. The theory’s emphasis on
transactional politics does not adequately address the continuing role of social groupings such as caste
nor does it acknowledge the critical role of leadership in building and sustaining the system.
Keywords
Clientelism, democratic deficit, corruption, centralization, post-clientelism
High-level corruption in India is garnering increasing national and international attention. Relentless
criticisms against graft were a major feature of the 2014 national elections. The Economist (15 March
2014) reported that ‘a well-established system of graft partly linked to political funding’ is discouraging
investors and damaging the economy. The amount of money involved is growing and the closeness of
businessmen to political power is pervasive (Kohli, 2012). Yet also, sustained campaign and civil society
activism against graft propelled a new reform party into power in Delhi in December 2013. Further, there
is evidence of a decline in lower-level corruption (Centre for Media Studies, 2010; Maiorano, 2014),
given innovations in service delivery and the use of technology to eliminate some intermediaries.
This article evaluates these inconsistent trends by examining the fate of the erstwhile united state of
Andhra Pradesh (AP), which was suddenly bifurcated in 2014 due, in significant part, to political failures
in its system of centralized graft. The state’s Congress party, which had been one of India’s most success-
ful parties, both in winning elections and in reforming governance, was so thoroughly trounced in the
2014 election that it won no seats in one of the successor assemblies and was a minority in the other.
1 Professor, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, United States.
Studies in Indian Politics
4(1) 22–36
© 2016 Lokniti, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2321023016634915
http://inp.sagepub.com
Corresponding author:
Carolyn Elliott, Professor, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, United States.
E-mail: carolynelliott.uvm@gmail.com
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