Central Asia
| Author | Ajay Patnaik |
| Published date | 01 July 2016 |
| Date | 01 July 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020881717746549 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Central Asia: Between
Stability and Instability
Ajay Patnaik1
Abstract
The newly independent countries of Central Asia were eager to integrate their
economies with the global economy. This required not only the dismantling of
the state-controlled economy but also ushering in some form of democracy, free
press and independent civil society. Beginning with 1991, the leadership in Central
Asia tried to shed the tag of being Communist Party leaders and sought political
legitimacy on the basis of nationalism and democracy. As a result, the initial years
following independence saw some progress away from the Soviet political system.
But later this trend weakened and most states moved to a more authoritar-
ian system. Some scholars argue that this is due to the enduring Soviet political
culture. This could be so; but after nearly 26 years, everything cannot be attrib-
uted to Soviet legacy. This article argues that Central Asian states are strongly
influenced by the current developments within and outside. The continuation
of authoritarianism has been possible because of popular support for the leader
as a symbol of stability. However, there are factors that could change popular
perception and shake the edifice of the current system.
Keywords
Nationalism, authoritarianism, radicalism, stability, globalisation, poverty, protests
Early Post-Soviet Transition
Like the rest of USSR, Central Asian republics had experienced ‘Democracy from
above’ during the Gorbachev period. However, Central Asia did not witness mass
movements for either independence or greater autonomy like in some of the other
republics—Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic republics. Those regions where popular
movements were strong, citizens came to play a bigger role in the affairs of the state,
unlike people in Central Asia. Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost (openness) had
opened the doors for popular nationalist movements that also had elements of
Article
International Studies
53(3–4) 176–194
2018 Jawaharlal Nehru University
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0020881717746549
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/isq
1 Professor, Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India.
Corresponding author:
Ajay Patnaik, Professor, Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, India.
E-mail: patnaik.ajay@gmail.com
Patnaik 177
liberalism, and people began to question the Soviet system itself. For example, at
the second congress held on 8 October 1989 of Latvian Popular Front, the largest
political alliance in the republic then, along with the goal of ‘complete independence’
for the Latvian state the participants also agreed on the creation of a free-market and
multi-party democracy. The same situation existed in the other two Baltic republics
of Lithuania and Estonia. In the March 1991 referendum on the continuation of a
socialist USSR, nearly 30 per cent of the Ukrainians who voted opted against pre-
serving the Soviet Union. By that time, Rukh movement had emerged as a leading
nationalist organization in the republic (Keller, 1989; Mcfaul, 2007).1
However, nationalism in Central Asia took another character: that of not oppos-
ing the Soviet state or system, but pitting one ethnic group against another. This
was visible in government policies favouring the majority ethnic group, as well as
in ethnic violence targeting minorities. Before the scars of the 1990 riots could
heal, conflict again broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups in Kyrgyzstan
in 2010. There are differences between Soviet and post-Soviet periods in terms of
ethnic mobilization. Since independence, ethnic sentiments are cynically manipu-
lated in the competition for state power, visible in the Tajik Civil War and the
2010 riots in Kyrgyzstan (Patnaik, 2012, pp. 336–344).2
Like political changes, Central Asia’s nationalism was also articulated and
implemented from above. For example, there were language laws favouring the
titular language in most Central Asian states beginning with 1990. Change of
place and street names, introduction of Latin script by some states, shifting of the
capital in Kazakhstan and so on were leadership-initiated moves, without much
popular demand. Thus, the leadership, which in most cases was the continuation
from the Soviet times, assumed a bigger role in the post-Soviet period of nation-
building. As Boris Kagarlitsky wrote in his then popular book, Farewell
Perestroika, the ‘growing bureaucratic autonomy’ of the Gorbachev years allowed
the ruling local elite in Central Asia to discriminate against the national minorities
(Kagarlitsky, 1990, pp. 61–62).
Nationalism in the Central Asian region, which was bereft of democratic content
in Gorbachev years, in many instances came to be associated with religious identity.
This further eroded inclusiveness and plurality, which is the essence of liberalism.
Majoritarian nationalism from above and religious revivalism from below made it
difficult for minority ethnic or religious groups to feel safe. There was large-scale
migration of Russians and other Slavic groups from Central Asia. Also, under pres-
sure were ethnic minorities, though they belonged to the same religious denomina-
tion. Between 1992 and 1994, large-scale migration of refugees and forced migrants
from Central Asia to Russian Federation took place—450,821 in 1992 and another
652,353 in 1994. This trend continued till the end of the decade.3
Nation-building
Soviet disintegration and the independence of former Soviet republics opened
many old wounds. Given the rising tide of nationalism, there was a real danger of
old territorial claims and inter-ethnic rivalries breaking out into violent conflicts.
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