Book Review: Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order
| Published date | 01 October 2018 |
| Date | 01 October 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020881718814311 |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
Book Reviews 353
Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of
World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 362 pp.
US$84.99. ISBN: 978-1-316-61351-1 (Paperback).
DOI: 10.1177/0020881718814311
Richard Sakwa, one of the prolific writers on post-Soviet politics, in his latest
book advances a refreshing perspective to understand the events in the aftermath
of the Cold War. He highlights the failure of the post-Cold War international system
to establish an inclusive and peaceful order in Europe. As a result, the world
witnessed a period (1989–2014) of, what Sakwa describes, ‘Cold Peace’ between
Russia and the West, which culminated with the Ukrainian imbroglio in 2014.
The Ukrainian crisis was a watershed moment in global politics which led to the
emergence of, what many scholars loosely dub, a phase of ‘New Cold War’.
Sakwa is not very fond of the phrase ‘New Cold War’, which he feels can be
deceptive in grasping the broader shift that has taken place since 2014. This book
is an endeavour to describe how the strained relationship between Russia and the
Atlantic community is paving the way for a global realignment. The author chal-
lenges the prevalent notion that events which took place since the Ukrainian
impasse is a mere repetition of the erstwhile Cold War rivalry.
Sakwa provides a succinct account of how the inability/unwillingness of the
Atlantic alliance system to overcome the Cold War institutions and ideas led to
present acrimony between Russia and the West. The author gives credit to the
transformative outlook of last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, for helping to end
the Cold War with his New Political Thinking (NPT). This approach to politics,
which was based on consensus, would make the end of Cold War a common victory
for all. However, in reality, what happened was just the opposite. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), the ‘Historical West’,
claimed victory and sought to lay the ground for an expanded liberal international
order with dominant Western values and norms. This was in sharp contrast to
Russian aspirations of being a founding and equal member of a transformed
‘Greater West’ eventually leading to Greater Europe. Gorbachev’s ‘common
European home’ and former French President Charles de Gaulle’s Europe ‘from
the Atlantic to the Urals’ were in line with this vision of Greater Europe.
In the post-Cold War world order, Russia found itself in a position of strate-
gic impasse which would dilute its unique identity and great power status.
Although, the Atlantic powers invited their former adversary to be a part of the
stable rule-based system, the Russian scepticism arose from the fact that the
West wanted an enlarged/extended order with the existing institutions and struc-
tures reminiscent of the Cold War era. Russia, on the other hand, wanted to be a
part of a transformed Europe as a core constitutive member. Sakwa argues, by
denying ‘the logic of transcendence’ of Russia, the European enlargement pro-
cess essentially gave birth to what it intended to avoid. This is where Sakwa
joins the dots to analyse the Russian attempt to assert an independent position
through actions (e.g., the Ukrainian crisis, which the West dubs as blatant military
aggression). Sakwa argues that Russia’s assertive behaviour in Ukraine is due to
the failure of the post-Cold War international system, provoking Russian resistance
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