Summary
Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court,
^HELD: 1. The provision contained in Section 3(3) of Act LXVII of 1976 is peremptory and the prohibition is mandatory because there is punishment provided for contravention of that provision. Breach of Section 3(3) is made punishable with imprisonment. The 1976 Act totally prohibits working of any coal mines by any agency other than those which have been set out in Section 3(3). Surely, there is no authority for the managements under whom the present petitioners are alleged to be workmen to operate coal mines in the face of the prohibition of the 1976 Act. Even for granting leases and their renewal by the State itself, the frown and force of the law stand four square between the mines and extraction of coal by any but the agencies specified in section 3(3) of the 1976 Act [589F-G, 591A, B & C]2. Investigation of the State or intimation by the private managements are obligatory under the appropriate legislation and in the absence of any intimation the presumption is that there are no such coal mines as are set up before the Court. What apparently has been done, if at all, is to do what has been described as 'scratching' that is surface mining of coal bearing areas, destructive of the natural resources of the nation without any thought for the morrow and without any reference to the planned, phased programme of exploitation of coal for the benefit of the country in the public sector. The mines, if any, are illicitly being operated, there being no sanction of the law. It is precisely to prevent this mischief of slaugter mining that s.3(3) was introduced and s.4 was enacted to make the activity punishable. The proscription is comprehensive and the penalty makes it imperative. When it is accepted that it is not permissible to operate these mines save by those specified in the 1976 statute, it necessarily follows that workmen, genuine or other, cannot claim any fundamental right to work these mines. [591D-G]3. The prohibition of mining as under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act, is in the public interest and indeed, the scheme shows that wherever public interest requires exploitation of coal mines it has been permitted in the public sector and even in the private sector so far as certain specified industries, such as iron and steel industries, are concerned. The ban is part of a national policy, conceived for conservation of a vital national resource and the wisdom of the regulation of 587fuel sources and their planned user is beyond argument.Therefore, the language of s. 3(3) is express, explicit and admits of no exception. An aware Court will not relax when the language is peremptory, the legislation is charged with a critical purpose and even the commiserative case of workmen-not wolves in sheep's clothing, cannot override the larger cause of the nation. No nation, no workmen. [591G-H, 592A]4. It is audacious for the dubious managements under whom the petitioners are supposed to be innocent workmen to represent to the Court that they are "deemed custodians"working on behalf of the Central Government. [592D-E]Under section S, notifications are a sine qua non for custodianship, actual or deemed and absent such notification taking over management no private agency can self-style itself as "deemed custodian". Therefore, the managements other than those specified in section 3(3) of the 1976 Act, can not claim to extract coal from any coal mines. If this be so, no one can claim as a workman, although in public interest, although it is imperative that such operation should stop. [593E-F]5. There is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution vis-a-vis the workmen concerned assuming them to be real workmen. After the dismissal of the management's writ petitions, the argument that the Act impugned is ultra vires vis a vis workmen is a daring legal workmanship. If a larger Bench of this Court has already upheld the vires of a statute the discovery of a new argument cannot invalidate that decision. That proposition will make the binding effect of precedents, read in the light of Art. 141 a vanishing cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain. [593F-H]The question of discrimination between two classes of workmen hardly arises because one set of mines has been closed down validly. If the closure is valid, no one employed there has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination. Denial of lay-off or other benefits belong to a different jurisdiction. If any workmen are really aggrieved that their interests are not protected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them to make representation to the Central Government for consideration of their lot, and certainly a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied that the grievance is genuine. [594A-B]6. Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint a receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or cooling coal. [594D-E]See the full content of this document
Extract
Dejapada Das And Anr. VS. Union Of India And Ors.
PETITIONER: DEJAPADA DAS AND ANR.Vs.RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1980BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R.BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R.REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)SEN, A.P. (J)CITATION: 1980 AIR 2031 1980 SCR (3) 586 1980 SCC (3) 412ACT: Coal Mines (Nationalisation Amendment) Act 1976 (Act No. LXVII of 1976), Sections 3(3) and 4 scope of-Whether Section 3(3) offends Article 14 of the Constitution in as much as in regard to Coal Mines where mining is prohibited by that provision the workmen are left in the cold while in regard to nationalised coal mines the workmen are taken care of and benefits assured Private managements whether deemed custodians under Section 5 of the Coal Mines Nationalisations Act 1973.JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1311, 1269- 70, 1113, 1109, 1479-1480, 924-925, 1478, 1250-1251, 1219, 926-927, 1072-1076, 1565, 1652-1654, 1434-1...
See the full content of this document