RC. Rev. No. 459 of 2012. Case: Balwant Kaur Chaudhary Vs Rambir Singh. High Court of Punjab (India)

Case NumberRC. Rev. No. 459 of 2012
CounselFor Appellant: Rajiv K. Chaudhary, Adv. and For Respondents: S.C. Singhal, Adv.
JudgesNajmi Waziri, J.
IssueDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14(1)(e), 14B, 14C, 14D, 25B; Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 - Sections 12, 12(1), 14(1), 2
Judgement DateAugust 05, 2014
CourtHigh Court of Punjab (India)

Judgment:

Najmi Waziri, J.

1. This petition impugns an order dated 23.8.2012, whereby the petitioners' petition under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) was rejected. The petitioners had sought the eviction of the respondent-tenant from the tenanted/suit premises bearing No.31/7, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi. The respondent/tenant has admitted that vide written agreement dated 18.4.1996, the tenanted premises were leased out to him by Shri Ashok Chaudhary, husband of petitioner No.2, Smt. Geeta Chaudhary. With the passage of time, Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary, husband of petitioner No.1 started claiming to be the owner of the property, for which he had filed a petition bearing No.E-215/2002, which is stated to be pending. Later the LRs of Shri Har Krishan Lal Chaudhary started claiming themselves to be, as legal heirs, landlords of the suit premises. The tenanted premises were sought by the petitioners on the ground of their bona fide personal need since they claimed to have had no alternate accommodation available to them to meet their requirements. They had sought the rejection of the application for leave to defend, which was sought by the respondent/tenant under Section 25B of the Act. However, instead of granting or rejecting the said application, the Trial Court dismissed the eviction petition itself on the ground that since petitioner No.2, Smt. Geeta Chaudhary, had died and it was admitted that her husband had let out the premises, therefore, the petition under Section 14D would not be maintainable. The Trial Court was of the view that for a person to invoke Section 14D of the Act, the premises must be required by the widow for her own use as residence. It is a special provision directed specifically in favour of the widows. The relief is specified and limited to a particular category of persons, i.e. widows and cannot be said to be extendable to the requirement of the family of the widow. The Trial Court concluded that with the demise of the petitioner concerned, i.e. petitioner No.2, her personal needs came to an end, hence, the petition would become infructuous. The Trial Court found that the judgements relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners, i.e. Parmeshwari Das v. G.R. Kohli 9 (1973) DLT 13 and Shakuntala Bai & Ors. v. Narayan Das & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3484 were not applicable to the facts of the present case, since the first case relied upon dealt with the landlord requiring the tenanted premises for the bona fide personal requirement for his own and his family's residence, while the latter case dealt with commercial accommodation being put to use by widows.

2. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have impugned the order on the following grounds:

i. That the Trial Court fell into an error by overlooking the fact that the determinative date for construing the requirement of landlord is the date of eviction petition and subsequent facts cannot be taken into consideration. Reliance is placed upon the judgements...

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